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 PART A 
I. ECONOMIC ROLES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND VALUE 
CREATION IN THE FACE OF STRUCTURAL MARKET CHANGE 
“Revolutions always come around again. That’s why they’re called revolutions.” 
Terry Pratchett, Night Watch 
Actors in a market assume one or more of the primary economic roles of an industry value 
chain, i.e. suppliers, producers, distributors and customers, to carry out value-creating activities. 
Suppliers create product components or provide raw materials, services, or expertise. Producers 
design and build products or services that aim at meeting customers’ specific needs. Distributors 
enable buyers and sellers to connect, communicate and to transact (Applegate, 2001).  
The structuring of economic action, the assignment of roles and the forming of relationships of 
actors, and hence the positioning of firms in their environment are central subjects of analysis in 
economic science. In the late 18th century, Adam Smith asserted that the division of labor is 
limited by the extent of the market. He argued that specialization should become more prevalent 
with increasing market size, since higher sales justify setting up firms which concentrate on 
formerly low volume production processes that are subject to increasing returns (Smith, 1776; 
see Stigler (1951) for a brief discussion and an integration of Smith’s conjecture into a theory of 
the functions of the firm). During the industrial revolution in the late 19th and the early 20th cen-
tury, the opposite could be witnessed: the advent of large integrated corporations as an answer 
to the managerial challenges of increasingly complex and high-volume production and distribu-
tion processes caused by technological progress, population growth and expanding per capita 
income (Chandler, 1977).  
Reviewing the above illustrated discrepancy of theoretical prediction and fact, Langlois (2003: 
352) concludes that it was the imbalance between “the coordination needs of high-throughput 
technologies and the abilities of contemporary markets and contemporary institutions to meet 
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those needs” which fostered the rise of large vertically integrated firms, exploiting economies of 
scale and scope, instead of specialized actors in disintegrated production processes.  
These days, markets are again subject to substantial changes which result in adaptations of stra-
tegic ends and organizational structure along the value chain (Langlois, 2003). Specifically, 
economic actors face significant shifts in the competitive landscape that challenge the firms’ 
strategies in the pursuit of obtaining competitive advantage (Hitt, Keats and DeMarie, 1998).  
First, developments in public policy change the rules of the game. Intending to realize lower 
prices for consumers as well as improvements of efficiency and quality, governments take ef-
forts of raising competition by liberalization of formerly regulated industries such as the elec-
tricity, air transportation, postal service or railway market. This has significant influence on the 
economic roles and relationships of actors along the value chain, as de-regulation can imply the 
disintegration of hitherto vertically integrated production processes, for instance in the case of 
railways (European Commission, 1996; 2001).  
Second, the rapid improvements of information and communication systems, namely, the inter-
net, electronic data interchange (EDI) systems and related network technologies, further lo-
wered communication costs and together with decreasing legal barriers to trade fostered the 
emergence of integrated markets with high trade volumes (Applegate, 2001; Langlois, 2003). 
This ubiquitous development, commonly referred to as the “technological revolution” or the rise 
of the “information age” (Applegate, 2001) greatly impacts the strategic management of firms in 
the new competitive landscape (Hoskisson, 1999).  
Bettis and Hitt (1995) describe the new imperatives that drive value chain configuration and 
strategic objectives in the new environment. The growing relevance of knowledge accumulation 
and deployment and decreased transaction costs emerge as main influence factors on strategy 
formulation. First, the high relevance of knowledge accumulation and deployment follows from 
the growing technological orientation of industries. That is, firms either make extensive use of 
technology within the production process or technology is a core element of the business model 
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(see, e.g. Amit and Zott, 2001). Second, information and communication technologies are lo-
wering transaction costs both within the production process and with customers by eliminating 
information asymmetries, decreasing asset specificities and by facilitating monitoring which 
mitigates the effects of opportunistic behavior (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Ciborra, 1993; Cordel-
la, 2006; Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987). 
As a consequence, the general understanding of how to create value, formerly grounded on the 
assumptions of roles and business processes of the industrial economy, is changing (Amit and 
Zott, 2001; Applegate, 2001). In particular, two significant trends become apparent: 1) the disin-
tegration of production processes and 2) the re-definition of customers’ roles in the value crea-
tion process.  
As transaction costs are reduced by information and communication technologies, and as know-
ledge takes up a more prominent role in organizations, externalizing certain functions of the 
firm has become a favored strategy in many cases. In particular, the above mentioned develop-
ments have led scholars and practitioners to see new opportunities for interfirm cooperation 
(Baum and Oliver, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Pillai, 2006; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
This insight manifests itself in a growing proliferation of hybrid organizing forms such as stra-
tegic alliances, joint ventures, franchising networks and related network forms of organisation 
(e.g. Parkhe, Wasserman and Ralston, 2006; Podolny and Page, 1998).  
Similarly, the boundaries of the firm are fading as customers’ economic roles are more frequent-
ly re-interpreted. Formerly being essentially the recipient of goods and services, nowadays the 
customer gets integrated into the value creation process (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004). This 
integration may take different forms, or degrees. For instance, customers might either serve as 
valuable information sources by submitting complaints, suggestions or by disclosing prefe-
rences through online behavior (Ehrmann, 2003) or they might even be woven into the value 
creation process by executing tasks which were formerly assigned to the distributor or producer 
role (e.g. Norman and Ramirez, 1993).  
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This thesis aims at taking a deeper look at key aspects of the aforementioned trends, i.e. 1) the 
disintegration of production processes and 2) the re-definition of customers’ roles, for the value-
creation process and firm performance from a strategic management perspective. Thereby, the 
chapters intend to critically reflect “common wisdom” about the performance effects of struc-
tural adaptations along the value chain. The studies hold implications for the successful design 
of value creation processes with respect to the assignment of roles, the management of relation-
ships and the choice of goods and services that are exchanged. The basic organizing principle 
and the specific research questions are outlined in the next section. 
 
 II. BASIC ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE  
In a way, the value chain can be viewed as a representation of the different economic roles of 
actors in a market that carry out value creating activities (Figure 1; Applegate, 2001). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Economic Roles of a Basic Value Chain 
The process of value creation can be analyzed with respect to the dimensions of structure, go-
vernance and content of transactions (Amit and Zott, 2001). These dimensions shall serve as a 
metaphorical framework, intending to facilitate the placement of this thesis’ chapters into the 
broader context of strategic management.1  
Applied to the context here, structure is closely related to the economic roles of a value chain 
since it describes the transactions that are performed, the actors who perform these transactions 
and how these actors are linked. Moreover, structure describes the sequencing of transactions as 
well as the adopted exchange mechanisms that enable transactions. The choice of structure and 
the assignment of activities to actors can have several crucial implications for value creation. 
First, actors can hold great potential for value creation (Ehrmann, 2003). For instance, consider 
the on-line travel portal Expedia.com which features a community-based review platform, the-
reby letting customers co-create value by providing information on hotels and destinations for 
other potential buyers. Second, the choice of transaction structure influences the flexibility, 
adaptability and scalability of transactions. Integrating certain activities implies the set-up of 
                                                     
1 Originally, Amit and Zott (2001: 511) propose these three dimensions as analytical framework for de-
scribing business models.  They establish that “A business model depicts the content, structure and go-
vernance of transactions designed so as to create value through the exploitation of business opportuni-
ties.” Although business model analysis in its narrow sense goes beyond the intention of this dissertation, 
these dimensions shall nevertheless serve as a metaphorical framework accommodating and structuring 
the specific research foci of this thesis. 
Suppliers Producers Distributors Customers
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specific machinery, the hiring of specialized personnel and so on. So if unforeseen circums-
tances changed customers’ preferences, and demand declined, significant overheads would pos-
sibly be left uncovered due to underutilization of capacity. In contrast, if this activity was out-
sourced, (variable) costs would decline approximately in line with demand (Langlois, 2003). 
However, structural set-up cuts both ways in terms of scalability and flexibility, as increases in 
production have to be backed by an increasing supply of intermediate goods. Hence, expansion 
depends on the capabilities, resources and willingness of outside actors to supply these goods or 
to perform certain activities.  
Transaction governance refers to the ways in which transactions, i.e. flows of resources, infor-
mation and goods, are controlled by the actors (Amit and Zott, 2001). This also refers to the 
legal forms of organization, contractual design as well as profit allocation mechanisms and 
hence, the incentive structure of transactions. In this respect, transaction governance is a crucial 
parameter of economic outcomes as it determines the extent to which potentials for value crea-
tion can be translated into actual value. Hence governance mechanisms can either hinder or 
encourage the timely transfer of information, parties’ motivation to act in compliance with prior 
agreements or to invest specifically, for example.  
Content denotes the actual “goods or information that are being exchanged, and to the capabili-
ties and resources that are required to enable the exchange” (Amit and Zott, 2001: 511). The 
value creation potential of transaction content lies in the combination of complementary and 
specialized resources and capabilities which differ within an industry (e.g. Barney, 1991; Ha-
mel, 1991; Teece, 1987).  
The complex interplay in the choice of transactional structure, governance and content might be 
illustrated by a very simplified example. Consider the online retailer Amazon.com. In attempt-
ing to leverage the technological advantages of online commerce over offline retailing, Amazon 
had to carefully asses own resources and capabilities as well as the resources and capabilities of 
the other market participants in assigning activities and shaping the firm specific value chain. 
On the one hand, Amazon’s centralized warehouses and its virtual store allow for an abundant 
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product variety due to unlimited shelf space and diminishing opportunity costs of listing. How-
ever, for this product variety to translate into value, i.e. sales, the heterogeneity of choice has to 
be made accessible to the customer. Considering only firm internal resources, Amazon would 
not be able to promote single articles in terms of providing individual advice with respect to the 
quality of an article or the fit between a customer’s preferences and the article’s characteristics. 
Yet, the customer crowd can. In implementing recommender systems which analyze customers’ 
purchase patterns and in providing a platform that allows for user-generated online reviews, 
Amazon enables value co-creation by customers. By furthermore establishing a system which 
allows to rate the reviews themselves, Amazon provides incentive structures that promote cus-
tomers to actually provide review information.  
As noted above, the chapters of this dissertation analyze different aspects of structural adapta-
tions along the value chain, thereby considering the general trends of 1) the disintegration of 
production processes (chapters I and II) and 2) the re-interpretation of the customers’ role (chap-
ters III and IV). From a theoretical perspective, each chapter focuses on the structural dimension 
and – primarily – one of the two other dimensions, i.e. governance and content.2 The specific 
research foci and contributions to the literature are outlined below. 
 
                                                     
2 As outlined above structural adaptations are – in most cases – connected with both the other dimensions; 
either by being motivated by resource considerations or because structural adaptations imply adaptations 
of governance mechanisms. However, in order to provide a concise overview, the chapters are classified 
according to their primary focus. 
 III. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
1. An Experimental Analysis of Organizational Structure and Specific 
Investments in Railways*3 
Chapter I addresses the issue of incentive structures under different organizational designs of 
the production process in the railway industry. European guidelines suggest a separation of in-
frastructure provision and transport operation to promote efficiency and to mitigate welfare 
losses due to potential market foreclosure and discrimination of third-party network access (Eu-
ropean Commission, 1991; 2001; Nash and Preston, 1994). However, vertical disintegration can 
entail substantial disadvantages in terms of value creation because incentive conflicts might lead 
to severe under-investment in specific assets (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Pitt-
man, 2007; Rothengatter, 2001).  
According to modern institutional economics, a vertical separation of infrastructure from opera-
tions in network industries is an inferior form of organization if investments are specific and 
contracts incomplete (Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978; Crocker and Masten, 1991). Because specific investments yield significantly lower values 
or lower gains from trade, when employed in a transaction other than originally intended 
(Joskow, 2003), the investor bears the risk of being exploited by an opportunistic transaction 
partner, who will appropriate the difference between the value of the investment in its first and 
second-best use (quasi-rent) in an ex-post bargaining process. If the investor anticipates the risk 
of a hold-up and if contractual arrangements to avert hold-ups are hindered by incomplete con-
tracts, he will not undertake the investment at all. In network industries, underinvestment may 
occur on either side of the transaction. 
A large body of theoretical research analyzes possible consequences of different organizational 
designs in railways. Yet, there is only sparse quantitative evidence on the effects of separation. 
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann, Karl-Hans Hartwig and Torsten Marner. 
For the discussion paper see: Ehrmann, T., Hartwig K.-H., Marner, T. and Schmale, H. (2009), Specific 
Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways: An Experimental Analysis. Discussion Paper No. 12 
of the Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster. 
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This is mainly due to the fact that the settings in the different countries are difficult to compare 
and that sufficiently large databases necessary for empirical research are only available for few 
of the relevant variables (Nash and Rivera-Trujillo, 2004). Most previous studies on vertical 
separation test for economies of scope (Preston, 1996; Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009) and ana-
lyze the implications on competition and on efficiency and productivity growth (Nash and Pres-
ton, 1994; Bitzan, 2003; Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes, 2003; Driessen, Lijesen and Mulder, 2006; 
Sanchez, Monsalvez and Martinez, 2008). However, there is a substantial lack of quantitative 
evidence on investment behavior considering asset specificity, incomplete contracts and hold-up 
hazards. 
Chapter I seeks to address this research gap in providing quantitative evidence on the conse-
quences of different organizational structures and profit allocation mechanisms with respect to 
investment incentives.  
An experimental analysis based on the theoretical framework of property rights theory (Gross-
man and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) is applied to the specific context of 
railways. In particular, three different organizational structures are modeled, i.e. vertical integra-
tion, vertical separation, and a hybrid form. 
Economic theory predicts that vertical integration fosters socially optimal investment, whereas, 
due to potential hold-up problems, both vertical separation and hybrid forms cause severe unde-
rinvestment. These theoretical predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment and evidence 
suggests that, in a vertically integrated environment, the level of investment in rolling stock and 
in rail infrastructure is roughly socially optimal. However, the results do not confirm a clear 
discrepancy in results between vertical separation and the hybrid organizational structure, as 
predicted by model-theory. This contradiction might also be explained by the existence of social 
preferences. 
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2. The Costs and Benefits of Networking*4 
In the pursuit of optimizing the structure of the value creation process, externalizing certain 
activities has become a valid option for many firms, as is demonstrated by the increase of inter-
firm alliances and related network forms of organization (Gulati, 1995). In particular, network 
forms of organization are emphasized to offer specific means of governance which allow for 
controlling exchange relations in a superior way, thereby leading to a competitive advantage of 
interconnected firms. 
Yet, from a research perspective there is a striking imbalance of studies promoting the benefi-
cial effects of networking as opposed to those emphasizing potential downsides of interfirm 
collaboration (e.g. Labianca and Brass, 2006; Parkhe, Wasserman and Ralston, 2006). Hence, 
the costs and dysfunctionalities of networking remain underexplored. Accordingly, Podolny and 
Page (1998: 66) state that the “attention to the functionality of network forms of organization 
explains why economic actors rely on network forms of organization, but it does not explain 
why they do not.” Moreover, they argue that the widespread approach to concentrate on analyz-
ing the benefits of networking might be useful for explaining varying reliance on networks be-
tween industries, since the relevance of collaboration-related benefits, such as learning and 
knowledge transfer, could differ from sector to sector. However, it still remains unclear why a 
considerable fraction of actors within an industry may constantly rely on hierarchical gover-
nance modes without investing in network building. 
Chapter II seeks to address this issue in providing a brief conceptualization of the sources of 
networking costs and benefits based on findings from diverse theoretical perspectives such as 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1985), the resource based view (e.g. Barney, 1991) and 
social network theory (e.g. Granovetter, 2005; Uzzi, 1996). Important sources of benefits are 
knowledge transfer, relation-specific investments (e.g. in dedicated machinery or human capi-
tal), and access to complementary and/or scarce resources (e.g. reputation). Important costs 
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann. An early version of this chapter was 
presented at the EMNet 2007 Conference in Rotterdam, NL. See: Ehrmann, T. and Schmale, H. (2007), 
The Costs and Benefits of Networking. Working Paper presented at the International Conference on Eco-
nomics and Management of Networks, 2007, Rotterdam, NL. 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 11
 
involved in networking are transaction costs, originating from the need to control potentially 
opportunistic partners (e.g., White and Siu-Yun Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1996) and coordination 
costs related to coordination efforts independent from incentive conflicts (Camerer and Knez, 
1997; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Moreover, and in line with findings from recent research on networking, non-linearities in the 
relationship between the level of networking activity and the costs and benefits of networking 
are considered. Hence, the argumentation explicitly accounts for varying value effects of differ-
ent activity levels within the governance mode of networking since intensity of usage has been 
revealed as a crucial determinant of optimal institutional choice (Burt, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). 
Finally, the consideration of opportunity costs – being defined as foregone net benefits from the 
most attractive alternative resource employment (e.g. Varian, 1997) – is a necessary precondi-
tion for quantifying the competitive advantage a particular governance form actually offers. The 
disregard of an opportunity cost calculus would impede the comparison of alternatively availa-
ble governance modes, and consequently, the identification of competitive advantage. A simple 
heuristic model summarizes the main thoughts and illustrates that too extensive a reliance on 
network resources can imply a competitive disadvantage for interconnected firms. 
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3. The Impact of e-Word-of-Mouth on the Sales Distribution in Online 
Book Retailing*5  
The value creation potential of customers is receiving more and more recognition by practition-
ers and scholars. Firms more frequently “outsource” certain activities which were formerly as-
signed to the distributor role to customers. Examples are the implementation of automatic re-
commender systems and community-based product review platforms in online retailing. Via 
these systems, customers co-create value in reducing other potential customers’ search costs. 
They do this either indirectly by just purchasing goods, i.e. filtering tools analyze product 
choices, infer taste patterns and recommend adequate products to like-minded customers 
(Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson, 1999), or directly by writing product reviews, thereby lower-
ing product quality uncertainty. In this respect firms combine own resources and capabilities 
with those of the customer and thereby create new business opportunities.  
The insight that customers are a critical source of value is the backbone of a recent phenomenon 
called “the long tail” (Anderson, 2006). In a nutshell, the long tail phenomenon describes the 
circumstance that in online retailing niche offerings account for a higher fraction of total sales 
than in offline retailing. This is driven by two facts. Firstly, in the online channel physical re-
strictions and cost constraints on assortment size disappear because of unlimited shelf space and 
centralized warehousing. Secondly, the above mentioned search cost reductions allow customers 
to venture into the niche to find products that better fulfill personal requirements than already 
known mainstream products. This in turn reflects one of the two basic assumptions which cha-
racterize the long tail literature. The assumption is that consumers differ in preferences, i.e. con-
sumers value niche products which are tailored to their individual preferences more than prod-
ucts that are designed for mass appeal (e.g. Anderson, 2006; Elberse, 2008). The second as-
sumption is that products differ in terms of search cost (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester, 2006). 
Specifically, key products which are heavily promoted by extensive marketing campaigns (e.g. 
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann. An early version of this chapter was 
presented at the ICIS 2008 Conference in Paris, F. See: Ehrmann, T. and Schmale, H. (2008), The Hit-
chhiker’s Guide to the Long Tail: The Influence of Online Reviews and Product Recommendations on 
Book Sales – Evidence from German Online Retailing. Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Information Systems, 2008, Paris, F. 
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TV ads, magazine promotion etc.) are visible per se. Niche products on the other hand are not 
visible per se and consequently profit more – in terms of sales – from a search cost reduction. 
From this follows that the shape of the demand curve will change as a result of a search cost 
reduction; from the rather steep sales distributions of bestseller-driven winner-take-all markets 
to more equally distributed sales in a world of “countless niches” (Anderson, 2006; Bryn-
jolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2003; Brynjolfsson et al., 2006). The question now is whether this pre-
diction holds and whether actors within the value chain should abandon bestseller strategies in 
favor of long tail strategies.  
Despite the widespread belief among researchers and practitioners that user-generated online 
reviews and discussion forums are crucial instruments for driving demand down the tail there 
still is only sparse empirical evidence on the effectiveness of e-Word-of-Mouth (eWOM) in-
struments for reducing search costs in the long tail, and particularly, on their role in changing 
the sales distribution. 
Exploring the long tail phenomenon, chapter III empirically analyzes whether online reviews, 
discussion forums, and product recommendations reduce search costs and if they can promote 
an altering of the sales distribution towards equality in online book retailing. By developing an 
innovative approach, the first long tail conversion model for the German online market is pro-
vided – based on publicly available sales data. A data set containing over 30,000 different books 
is analyzed and the results show that e-Word-of-Mouth reduces search costs by facilitating the 
identification of adequate books and their quality assessment. Moreover, unconditional quantile 
regressions reveal differences in the functionality of eWOM with respect to popular and unpo-
pular books. 
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4. Buying Without Using: Biases of German BahnCard Buyers*6 
While data mining processes and thus value co-creation by customers is a core element of many 
digital businesses, firms in non-digital markets generally face substantial restrictions to the ob-
servability of customer behavior on an individual basis. For instance in the railway market, 
standard ticket purchases are not personalized and consequently transport providers can draw 
conclusions from purchase behavior on an aggregate level but not on an individual level. How-
ever, information on transport usage on an individual level can hold critical information for 
optimizing the value creation process in terms of answering basic questions like “what should 
be sold and how should it be sold?”.  
In an attempt to raise intermodal competitiveness of rail travel and furthermore to allow for 
segment-specific price differentiation for occasional and frequent travelers, the German rail 
company Deutsche Bahn AG introduced different two-part tariffs. These allow actors to pay a 
fixed up front fee and then receive a reduction on each ticket purchase (Dolan and Simon, 
1996). The customer then has to find the contract that minimizes the price for every mile tra-
veled.  
A frequent approach to analyzing consumer behavior – when actual usage is unobserved – is to 
draw inferences from contract choice on preferences and thus demand (e.g. Miravete and Röller, 
2003). A standard assumption then is that consumers have rational expectations about their fu-
ture consumption frequency and choose the utility maximizing contract. However, if customers 
display non-standard preferences and beliefs, inferences made under the assumption of rational 
expectations can lead to substantial error (Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2006). A growing body 
of literature suggests that consumers indeed deviate from standard utility maximizing behavior 
in many cases and choose contracts that are sub-optimal from an ex post perspective considering 
actual usage (e.g. Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2006; Kling and van der Ploeg, 1990; Kridel, 
Lehman and Weisman, 1993; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006; Miravete, 2002; Mitchel and Vogel-
sang, 1991; Train, Ben-Akiva and Atherton, 1989). Profit-maximizing firms should respond to 
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann and Alexander Dilger. 
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these non-standard features of behavior in their product and contract design (Della Vigna and 
Malmendier, 2006). 
Chapter IV of this thesis addresses this issue by using a large data set of German railway travel-
ers for the first time to analyze the purchasing decision for fare-reducing BahnCards. The data 
comprise detailed information on customers’ individual demographic characteristics, BahnCard 
contract choices and individual transaction data, i.e. ticket purchase behavior. The sample of 
more than 250,000 contracts was drawn from the population of members of the company’s cus-
tomer loyalty programs “bahn.bonus” and “bahn.comfort”.  
It is expected that tariff choice is neither completely rational nor irrational, but bounded-rational 
in a meaningful way. Actually the study predicts a flat-rate bias, i.e. many actors choose a con-
tract involving a high fixed fee and low variable costs although another contract with a lower 
fixed fee and higher variable costs would have resulted in a lower billing rate, given their dem-
onstrated demand (Nunes, 2000). Moreover, it is estimated that this bias is higher for more ex-
pensive BahnCards, while nevertheless the buyers of these BahnCards travel more than those of 
cheaper ones and renew their cards with a higher probability. Although many contracts are un-
der-used, the average BahnCard should be worth its money, implying that the correctly using 
customers win more than the under-users loose or, alternatively, that the expected utility of any 
particular BahnCard is positive. Finally it is expected that learning exists and the usage of 
BahnCards improves over time, as well in the aggregate of all users as for individual ones. The 
empirical results approve these hypotheses for the most part, especially for the more expensive 
BahnCard50, whereas the under-use of the cheaper BahnCard25 is so extensive that it is not 
worthwhile on average. 
 
 
 IV. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the systematization of this thesis’s chapters. The first two 
chapters basically focus the trend of disintegration of production processes. Chapter I investi-
gates the impact of a disintegration of the production process in railways on investment incen-
tives thereby focusing the structure and governance dimensions of the value creation process. 
Chapter II analyzes the recent increase in interfirm collaborations from a theoretical perspective. 
In drawing attention to the costs of networking structural and governance aspects are focused. 
The next chapters, chapter III and chapter IV, turn to the downstream segments of the basic 
value chain in focusing on the value co-creation potential of customers and thus on the structure 
and content dimensions. Figure 3 provides a brief summary of research aims, methods and find-
ings. 
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 PART B 
I. AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS IN 
RAILWAYS*7  
1. Abstract 
We analyze the impact of different organizational structures on incentives to invest in railways: 
vertical integration, vertical separation, and a hybrid form. Economic theory predicts that vertic-
al integration fosters socially optimal investment, whereas, due to potential hold-up problems, 
both vertical separation and hybrid forms cause severe underinvestment. We test these theoreti-
cal predictions in a laboratory experiment and find evidence that, in a vertically integrated envi-
ronment, the level of investment in rolling stock and in rail infrastructure is roughly socially 
optimal. The absence of a clear discrepancy in our experimental results between vertical separa-
tion and the hybrid organizational structure, contradicting the predictions of model-theory, is 
surprising and can be attributed to the relatively high investments in the separated model. This 
contradiction might also be explained by the existence of social preferences. 
  
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann, Karl-Hans Hartwig and Torsten Marner. 
For the discussion paper see: Ehrmann, T., Hartwig K.-H., Marner, T. and Schmale, H. (2009), Specific 
Investments and Ownership Structures in Railways: An Experimental Analysis. Discussion Paper No. 12 
of the Institute of Transport Economics, University of Muenster. 
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2. Introduction 
“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” 
Winston Churchill 
Since European policy is presently demanding more competition in European railways, vertical 
relationships in railways are subject of substantial controversy. Advocates of a vertical separa-
tion of infrastructure from transport operation argue that, even if vertically integrated firms are 
obliged to grant third-party access to railway infrastructure, potential for market foreclosure and 
discrimination will continue to exist and competition will remain restricted (Nash and Preston, 
1994; European Commission, 1996; Link, 2003). Therefore, vertical separation is regarded as 
the only way to enhance competition within the railway industry. Proponents of vertical integra-
tion argue that an institutional separation would reduce economic welfare, because of losses of 
economies of scope, of lower consumer attractiveness due to coordination failure and of insuffi-
cient investment as a result of asset specificity, incomplete contracts and hold-up hazards (Can-
tos, 2001; Pfund, 2003; Pittman, 2007). 
There is a large body of theoretical research that supports these positions, highlighting the 
drawbacks and inefficiencies of vertical separation, as well as the advantages and disadvantages 
arising from vertical integration solutions. This abundance of theoretical research contrasts with 
the low number of recent empirical studies, even though a very substantial number of institu-
tional settings for the railway sector have been established worldwide in the mean-time (Go-
mez-Ibanez, 2004; Cantos and Campos, 2005; Nash, 2006). According to Nash and Rivera-
Trujillo (2007) the lack of empirical evidence is due to the fact that most of these settings are 
not comparable, in particular due to the short time horizon of reform experiences. Sufficiently 
large data bases necessary for analytical research are available only for a few of the relevant 
variables. Most previous studies on vertical separation test for economies of scope (Preston, 
1996; Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009) and analyze the implications on competition and on effi-
ciency and productivity growth (Nash and Preston, 1994; Bitzan, 2003; Friebel et al., 2003; 
Driessen et al., 2006; Sanchez et al., 2008). Up to now, there is only one empirical study on 
asset specificity, incomplete contracts, hold-ups and investment behavior in different institu-
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tional settings of rail industry by Merkert, Nash and Smith (2008). From the perspective of the 
New Institutional Economics, the authors analyze the impact of the governance structures of 
British, German and Swedish railways on competition and on the transaction costs of different 
interactions between infrastructure managers and train operators. The data have been collected 
by reviewing policy documents and contracts from seven pre-specified transaction areas and 
interviews with infrastructure managers, senior managers from train operators, regulators and 
industry associations. The results show that, although asset specificity and incomplete contracts 
do exist, the frequency, uncertainty and complexity of coordination and contractual interactions 
are perceived as more relevant than investment hold-up or lock-in issues (p. 27). All in all, the 
authors conclude that vertical separation turns out to be the “clearest approach in terms of non-
discrimination” and viable at reasonable cost, in “terms of transaction cost economics” (p. 40). 
In order to determine whether a separate railway organization would reduce or even eliminate 
the incentive to invest on one or even both sides (the infrastructure provider and the transport 
operator), so that underinvestment may occur, raising costs and diminishing welfare in the long 
run, we adopt an experimental approach. Based on the seminal work of Grossman and Hart 
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) on specific investments and the structure of 
vertical relationships, we model investment behavior in various institutional arrangements in 
railways, hypothesize corresponding investment levels and test these hypotheses through expe-
rimental research. Such research provides an alternative framework to systematically designing 
varying institutional settings and analyzing the resultant incentive structures and their impact on 
economic behavior (Roth, 1995). In our case, the approach sheds some empirical light, from 
another perspective, on an important aspect of restructuring the European railway industry, an 
issue has so far been discussed by means of more or less qualitative arguments in case studies. 
The fundamental question is whether the investment incentives associated with a separate insti-
tutional arrangement can cause a long-term investment problem and welfare losses. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3, we generally describe the hold-up prob-
lem and show the relevance of specific investments, opportunistic behavior and incomplete 
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contracts in railways. In Section 4, our model of investment behavior in different organizational 
structures is introduced, so that the expected investment levels can be hypothesized. Section 5 
contains the experimental design. In Section 6, the experimental results with respect to invest-
ment incentives are presented. In Section 7, the results are discussed, before we close with a 
summary and some future perspectives. 
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3. Specific Investments, Incomplete Contracts and Underinvestment in 
Railways: Theory and Previous Research 
According to modern institutional economics, a vertical separation of infrastructure from opera-
tions in network industries is an inferior form of organization, if investments are specific and 
contracts incomplete (Williamson, 1975 and 1985; Klein et al., 1978; Crocker and Masten, 
1991). Because specific investments yield significantly lower values or lower gains from trade, 
when employed in a transaction other than originally intended (Joskow, 2003), the investor 
bears the risk of being exploited by an opportunistic transaction partner, who will appropriate 
the difference between the value of the investment in its first and second-best use (quasi-rent) in 
an ex-post bargaining process. If the investor anticipates the risk of a hold-up and if contractual 
arrangements to avert hold-ups are hindered by incomplete contracts, he will not undertake the 
investment at all. In network industries, underinvestment may occur on either side of the trans-
action. The vertical integration of infrastructure and operations could constitute an institutional 
setting which prevents disincentives to invest.  
Previous research on the rail industry had indeed identified asset specificity in the network in-
frastructure as well as in the rolling stock. Primary arguments are the strong technical interde-
pendency of both of the input factors and the fact that investments not only require significant 
financial resources, but most often are completely irreversible (Rothengatter, 2001; Gomez-
Ibanez, 2004; Cantos and Campos, 2005; Pittman, 2005). Various empirical studies have at-
tempted to document and estimate asset specificity. Yvrande-Billon (2004) estimated a high 
level of specificity, measured by the impossibility of re-deployment of the rolling stock of Brit-
ish railways. According to Affuso and Newbery (2002), up to 82 per cent of each asset of the 
transport companies in Great Britain are specific. Ferreira (1997), Crozet (2004), Bouf et al. 
(2005), von Hirschhausen and Siegmann (2004) and Merkert et al. (2008) detected asset speci-
ficities of different kinds (physical specificity, site specificity, dedicated specificity and tempor-
al specificity) and different levels of relevance upstream on the infrastructure level as well as 
downstream on the operational level of rolling stock. 
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Common examples of asset specificity in the railway context are investments in high-speed rail 
lines and in modern signal and safety technology, such as the European Train Control System 
(ETCS) which allows for higher capacities and higher operating densities, due to the economi-
zation of permanent signaling equipment through the direct transmission of propulsion com-
mand via GSM (de Rus and Nombela, 2007; International Union of Railways, 2003). Invest-
ment in high-speed rail tracks and ETCS-infrastructure is enormously cost-intensive for infra-
structure companies and requires simultaneous investments in rolling stock by a transport opera-
tor who pays for and uses the track for a period sufficient for an amortization of the infrastruc-
ture investment. As Pittman (2007) points out, “a track operator can make certain investments to 
improve efficiency and performance, but the realization of these benefits depends significantly 
on actions taken by the train operator”. If the technological demand for transport operation ex-
hibits a lower level than high-speed rail and ETCS, it is impossible to maintain an appropriate 
price for track usage (Nash, 2005). The value of the investments will decrease. This is corres-
pondingly true vice versa, if the transport operator invests in high-speed trains or implements 
ETCS in rolling stock without corresponding investments from the infrastructure operator, as in 
the case of Virgin Rail, a British transport company (Pfund, 2003). 
In order to avoid the hazards of “downgrading” the infrastructure and rolling stock, investments 
have to be coordinated very exactly, so as to produce the final output of transportation and to 
improve quality in terms of timesaving and safer transport. With separate environments for rail 
infrastructure and transport operation, efficient coordination fails to take place, because of dis-
incentives to invest on both sides as a result of hold-up risks and incomplete contracts. Since 
investment behavior is neither fully observable nor enforceable by law “subject to shirking and 
opportunism, the investments on both sides may not be made and economic welfare will suffer 
as a result” (Pittman, 2007). A potentially superior institutional solution could take the form of 
vertical integration, which is proved empirically by the experiment described in the present 
chapter.  
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4. Theoretical Model 
4.1 Basic Structure  
In order to test the hypothesis that vertical integration is the superior form of organization in the 
railway industry with respect to asset specificities, we use the standard models of Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995). Theory states that incentives to invest 
depend on ownership structure. Because ownership structures in European railways are estab-
lished politically in conformity with EU guidelines (European Commission, 1991; 2001), we 
develop three different scenarios with exogenously predetermined ownership structures: 
1. vertical separation  
2. vertical integration  
3. hybrid form of organization.  
Ownership rights affect the incentive structure in determining the extent to which an investor 
can claim a generated surplus and thereby recover at least his initial investment costs. Hence, 
ownership creates the incentive to invest. We assume that investments are embodied in physical 
capital such as rolling stock and rail infrastructure, rather than in human capital. From this, it 
follows that the value of the investment is not bound to the investor, but solely to the respective 
asset.8 Furthermore, ownership of an asset assigns the right to make an investment, as well as 
the ability to transfer this right, since making the investment is assumed not to be specific to a 
particular individual.  
Investment decision rights are allocated to the transport operator (F1) and the infrastructure op-
erator (F2), together producing the final good of railway transport by a combination of the two 
specific assets of rolling stock (a1) and rail infrastructure (a2). In fact, the transport operator uses 
                                                     
8 If the investments were embodied in human capital, rather than in physical capital, an acquisition of the 
complementary asset, that is vertical integration, would not enable the new owner to generate a full sur-
plus, because part of the investment’s value would be tied to the former owner himself. Thus, in the case 
of integration, the acquiring firm would still have to negotiate with the former owner, in order to obtain 
full access to the investment, although it already controls the physical asset.  
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the track to produce transport activities. Depending on the ownership structure, both actors can 
either be completely autonomous firms or departments within one integrated firm. The gross 
surplus derived from the transport activity (S) depends on specific investments in rolling stock 
(i1) and in the rail infrastructure (i2): S(i1,i2). Investments increase the productivity of the assets 
and are made in period t = 1, in which investment costs c(i1) and c(i2) accrue to the investing 
party. Although in t = 1, it is clear that specific investments are required to produce the final 
good of transportation, uncertainty prevails as to the precise asset configuration. This is due to 
the fact that, particularly in the context of railways, the production of the final good is highly 
complex and therefore, the costs of defining a comprehensive contract over the exact uses of a1 
and a2 are assumed to be prohibitively high. This uncertainty also means that ex-ante contract-
ing involving the division of the surplus from cooperation is not feasible. Hence, the allocation 
of gross surplus cannot take place until investment is sunk and uncertainty is resolved in the 
next period, t = 2. Figure 4 summarizes this chronology of action.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Chronology of Action 
We assume that in the case considered here, the gross surplus from production S(i1,i2) is defined 
as )(20),( 2121 iiiiS += . Investment costs c(i1) and c(i2) are defined as 11 15)( iic =  and 
22 15)( iic = . Investments can be chosen from the interval { }10,...,2,1, 21 ∈ii . 
  
0 1 42 3
Ownership Structure Profit DistributionBreakup of Uncertainty
Specific Investments Bargaining/Production
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4.2 Vertical Separation 
In the case of vertical separation, one of the pure forms of privatization alternatives, the trans-
port operator F1 and the infrastructure operator F2 are completely autonomous firms. Each pos-
sesses one productive asset, that is, F1 owns and controls a1 and F2 owns and controls a2, so that 
the transport operator contributes to the provision of transport by making the rolling stock avail-
able, while the infrastructure operator contributes to the production of the final good of trans-
portation, by providing the rail infrastructure. Consequently, both actors independently and si-
multaneously choose investments in t = 1. After uncertainty is resolved in t = 2, they bargain 
over the infrastructure charge and type, determining the division of the resultant gross surplus 
S(i1,i2). Finally, when the actors reach agreement and trade occurs, ex-post pay pay-offs are 
realized for the transport operator ( 1Π ) and the infrastructure operator ( 2Π ), given by the fol-
lowing equations: 
(1) 
⎩⎨
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b denotes the transport operator’s negotiated share of the surplus, (1 – b) the infrastructure oper-
ator’s share in the case of agreement. However, it is important to note that a surplus is generated 
only if both actors agree to trade. Otherwise, the production of the final good is impeded, since 
both actors withdraw their asset from the production process. Since investments are sunk, each 
has to bear his individual investment costs.  
In our model, bargaining follows a Rubinstein alternating-offer structure with a maximum of ten 
bargaining rounds (Rubinstein, 1982) and a multiple-pie finite-horizon bargaining setting 
contractual agreement, 
non-agreement. 
contractual agreement, 
non-agreement. 
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(Sloof, 2004).9 In each bargaining round, one round-pie is negotiated between the two players. 
The size of each round-pie is 1/10 S(i1,i2). Both actors alternate in making offers with respect to 
the division of the ten round-pies, with the first offer being randomly assigned to one of the 
players. Actors are allowed to respond to offers in three different ways. Firstly, they can accept 
the offer and the round-pie of the current bargaining round, with all remaining round-pies being 
divided according to the agreement. Secondly, the responder can reject the offer and terminate 
negotiations. In this case, the current and all remaining round-pies are irrevocably lost and, con-
sequently, both players receive nothing. Thirdly, the player can reject and submit a counter offer 
instead. Bargaining then proceeds to the next round and the current round-pie is lost, this in turn 
reflecting the cost of negotiation. Finally, b and (1 – b) are determined by bargaining. 
We assume that the gains from trade are divided according to the Nash bargaining solution, that 
is, a 50/50 division of the surplus (Nash, 1950), so that investments result from the optimization 
of equations (3) and (4):  
(3) ),(),(
2
1
1211 iciiS −⋅=Π  
(4) ).(),(
2
1
2212 iciiS −⋅=Π 10 
Since )()(),( 2121 iciciiS +> does apply, in a first-best world, where coordination between the 
two parties is feasible, F1 as well as F2 would have an incentive to invest the maximum amount 
of i1,2=imax. In the absence of hold-up threats, the parties could redistribute any increase in value 
by means of ex ante lump-sum transfers.  
However, 11)/(2/1 ciS ∂<∂∂⋅ and 22 )/(2/1 ciS ∂<∂∂⋅ imply that individually, in an incom-
plete contracting world with rational and self-interested actors, investment entails strictly nega-
                                                     
9 In the interest of simplification, we disregard any other discounting effects. This guarantees the imple-
mentation of an exactly symmetrical Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). Any further discounting 
would have caused a first-mover advantage for the subject with the right of first offer. Here, backward 
induction predicts a sub-game perfect equilibrium with an equal share in the first bargaining round.  
10 This is true for 0/ >∂∂ iS  and .0/ 22 =∂∂ iS  For the sake of simplicity, investment costs are as-
sumed to be linear, so that 0/ >∂∂ ic  and .0/ 22 =∂∂ ic  
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tive net pay-offs. This follows from the fact that any increase in value, ,/ iS ∂∂  must be shared 
equally with the other partner, whereas increasing investment costs are incurred on one’s own. 
Consequently, the marginal costs of investment exceed the marginal benefits. Both the transport 
operator and the infrastructure operator will invest the minimum of i1 = i2 = imin, both anticipat-
ing opportunistic behavior in the form of a hold-up by the other party.11 Given the abovemen-
tioned parameterization, 121 510 ii −=Π  and 212 510 ii −=Π  describe the individual optimiza-
tion problems. Hence, for the transport operator, the choice of i1 = imin = 1 is optimal and for the 
infrastructure operator, it is optimal to choose i2 = imin = 1. This situation resembles a prisoners’ 
dilemma and results in bilateral underinvestment. The prisoners’ dilemma is documented by 
Figure 5 and depicts the profits accruing to the players at three different levels of investment (1, 
5, 10). Combination (i1, i2) = (1; 1) is a Nash equilibrium with a resulting overall profit of 
∏1+∏2=5+5=10, which is inferior to individually unstable investments of 10, generating an 
overall profit of ∏1+∏2=50+50=100. 
i1 ; i2 1 5 10 
1 5 ; 5 45 ; -15 95 ; -40
5 -15 ; 45 25 ; 25 75 ; 0 
10 -40 ; 95 0 ; 75 50 ; 50
Figure 5. Vertical Separation and Prisoners’ Dilemma 
  
                                                     
11 Only after their own investment is sunk, do the agents learn of the other party’s investment. In this 
respect, other constellations are also possible. Nöldeke and Schmidt (1998) and Smirnov and Wait (2004) 
concentrate, for example, on the problem of underinvestment in the case of sequential investments. In the 
railway context, existing monitoring and contract-enforcement problems imply that the application of 
simultaneous investments is advisable.  
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4.3 Vertical Integration 
In the model of vertical integration, one fully integrated railway company owns the rights of 
control over the net infrastructure and the rolling stock, as well as the investment rights. There-
fore, there is no hold-up hazard and the investor can fully internalize revenue derived from his 
investments. The integrated firm’s investment incentives, therefore, are expressed in optimizing 
the following equation:12  
(5) ).()(),( 21212 iciciiS −−=Π  
Accordingly, the model predicts maximal investment levels for the integrated case: i1 = i2 = imax. 
Given the abovementioned parameterization, )(5 212 ii +=Π is true, investments in rolling 
stock and in transport operation reach their maximum levels: i1 = i2 = imax = 10, and thus, i1 + i2 
= 20. 
In the separate structure, the need to recover investment costs implies an incentive to fully util-
ize the enhanced productivity of assets. This holds, because any quality loss due to a reduction 
in effort would be counterproductive, given one’s own prior investment decision.13 However, in 
an integrated arrangement, this is not true for all production steps, taking into account that the 
transport division cannot make investment decisions and does not have to bear any investment 
costs. Given individual self-interest and rational behavior, the result is shirking by the transport 
division, in order to minimize the disutility of work (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Although 
shirking reduces the efficiency of those parts of the production process involving the transport 
operator’s effort and decreases the marginal benefits of investment, shirking does not affect 
investment incentives, because marginal benefits still significantly exceed marginal cost. 
                                                     
12 Equation (5) denotes the integrated firms’ ex-post pay-off in the case of Type 2 integration (see Hart, 
1995: 35), that is, F2 integrates F1 and thus, becomes the sole owner of the entire set of assets, a1 and a2. 
Alternatively, we could have considered the case of Type 1 integration. Given the symmetry of paramete-
rization, this would not have any effect on the theoretical predictions regarding investment incentives. 
Therefore, we content ourselves with the analysis of one case. 
13 Taking this aspect into consideration further strengthens the consistency of our experimental investiga-
tion, since this aspect implies interaction between F1 and F2, although F2 is the sole owner of the assets 
and makes the investment decisions. 
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS IN RAILWAYS 36
 
4.4 Hybrid Model 
Considering the ownership-structure continuum, which is bounded by full integration on one 
side and full separation on the other, there are obviously several alternative hybrid organization-
al designs (Ferreira, 1997). Below, we model a structure which partly separates the rights to 
control the assets from those of making an investment. Accordingly, the final good of rail trans-
portation is produced by a company which is subdivided into two divisions: the transport opera-
tor and the dominant infrastructure operator. The rights of control over rolling stock a1 and rail 
infrastructure a2 are assigned to the dominant infrastructure operator F2.14 Thus, analogously to 
the integrated case, this model also allows a full internalization of investments revenue. Never-
theless, this model differs in terms of investment-rights allocation. In particular, the dominating 
infrastructure operator transfers the responsibility and right to invest in the rolling stock to the 
dominated transport operator and pays remuneration w to F1, after receiving the complete gross 
surplus from the investments. Hence, in the first step, the transport operator decides on invest-
ment i1 and in the second step, he receives the compensation. 
(6) ),( 11 icw−=Π  
(7) .)(),( 2212 wiciiS −−=Π  
Because the infrastructure operator possesses all control rights and, therefore, full residual clai-
mant status, his incentive is to invest the maximum amount i2 = imax. His marginal benefits from 
investment exceed the marginal costs. The transport operator only decides to invest i1 = imin in 
anticipation of rational and self-interested behavior from the infrastructure operator, which im-
plies the minimum compensation w = wmin=15.15  
Given the above parameterization, 11 15iw −=Π  and wii −+=Π 212 520  are true. In equili-
brium, the transport operator invests an amount of i1 = imin = 1 and the infrastructure operator an 
amount of i2 = imax = 10. As a result, unilateral underinvestment occurs and the model of hybrid 
                                                     
14 To ensure consistency with regard to the integration model, we obviously consider Type 2 integration 
here as well. 
15 Note that F1 must invest at least the minimum of i1 = 1. 
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organization is therefore inferior to the integrated model but, in terms of investment incentives, 
superior when compared to the separated model. Table 1 summarizes the standard theoretical 
predictions of investment behavior and bargaining outcomes, given our parameterization.  
 Vertical Separation
Vertical 
Integration
Hybrid 
Model 
Stage 1    
i1 1 10 1 
i2 1 10 10 
i12 = i1 + i2 2 20 11 
Stage 2    
b 0,5   
w   15 
No. of rounds 1 1* 1* 
Asterisks indicate that the number of bargaining
rounds is fixed due to the setup of treatments. 
Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses 
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5. Experimental Design 
The experimental investigation consisted of six treatments, both multi- and single-period games 
for each of the three models. The computer-based experiments were carried out at the Depart-
ment of Economic Studies, Muenster University, Germany, in 2006. 256 respondents were re-
cruited from a homogenous group of students studying economics at an advanced level. For 
each treatment, the subject group was divided into two subgroups, half being assigned the role 
of transport operator (F1) and the other the role of infrastructure operator (F2). Subjects kept 
their role throughout the experiment. They were paid according to performance and earned, on 
average, €12.50 per hour.  
The multi-period treatment consisted of 12 rounds, during which each of the respondents were 
randomly and anonymously matched pair-wise. Instructions were handed out and read to all 
subjects. Thus, all had identical information about the rules and structure of the game. In order 
to ensure that any player knew the consequences of his decisions, we provided a simulation 
device. The simulator enabled the calculation of outcomes of investment and bargaining deci-
sions throughout the game. The subjects were also informed about the matching procedure. 
Hence, reputational effects should be minimized. Furthermore, the subgroups were located in 
separate rooms and communication within the subgroup was strictly forbidden. This ensured 
that no player could forecast his current partner’s decisions on the basis of past behavior.  
Each round involved two stages, an investment and a bargaining stage. This applies to the sin-
gle-period scenarios as well as to the multi-period scenarios.16 The single-period games in-
volved a single play of the two-stage game. At the investment stage, the subjects were requested 
to simultaneously choose their investment levels. However, as described above, the right to 
invest depends on the ownership structure. In the separated case and the hybrid case, both play-
ers – the one assigned the role of infrastructure operator and the counterpart – were provided 
with the right to invest in one of the assets. However, in the integrated case, the infrastructure 
                                                     
16 For simplicity, we will call the second stage the bargaining stage throughout the remainder of the 
study, even though, in the integrated case and the hybrid case, the second stage is more likely to resemble 
a dictator game rather than a bargaining game.  
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operator had the right to invest in both of the assets, i.e. rolling stock and infrastructure. At the 
bargaining stage, the impact of the considered ownership structures on the nature of the game 
was greater than at the first stage. In the integrated and hybrid cases, stage two consisted of the 
choice of compensation level by the infrastructure player. At stage two of the separation scena-
rio, the players were asked to allocate the surplus generated in stage one by the abovementioned 
bargaining process. 
In each of the considered treatments, the subjects were informed about the chosen investment 
levels before proceeding to the bargaining stage. At the end of stage two of each treatment, 
payments were made according to the bargaining results and, finally, investment costs were 
incurred by the investors. In the multi-period games, both players subsequently moved to the 
next game period and were again randomly matched with a partner. In the single-period games, 
the experiment finished at this point and the subjects were paid according to their performance. 
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6. Experimental Results 
In the multi-period treatments 44 subjects participated in the separated case, 44 in the hybrid 
case and 42 in the integrated case. With respect to investment behavior, the first result from the 
experiment is as follows: 
Result 1. Average investment levels are maximized in the integration model. Integration 
induces levels of investments close to the social optimum.  
The average total investment in rolling stock and rail infrastructure amounted to 14.70 in the 
separated case, 13.65 in the hybrid case, and 19.56 in the integration case. The experimental 
results thus evidently support the theoretical prediction with respect to the vertical integration 
model. In more than 92 per cent of the cases (466 out of 504), the respondents chose the effi-
cient investment level imax = 10.  
 Average Investment Levels Mann-Whitney-U-Test 
 Integration Hybrid Separation Int. and Sep. Int. and Hyb. Hyb. and Sep.
Variable Case Case Case Z p > Z Z p > Z Z p > Z 
i1 9.78 4.39* 7.51 -11.08 .000 -17.45 .000 -10.20 .000 
i2 9.79 9.26* 7.19 -11.39 .000 -4.64 .000 -8.19 .000 
i1+i2 19.56 13.65 14.70 -14.87 .000 -17.41 .000 -3.14 .002 
Asterisks indicate significant differences (<1%) within the same column, that is differences
in investments between F1 and F2 in the respective treatment.  
Table 2.  Investment Incentives, Two Sample, Non-Parametric Pair-Wise Tests 
A pair-wise comparison of the investments, conducted by means of the Mann-Whitney-U-Test, 
indicates the superiority of the integrated model (p < .01). Table 2 shows the results from three 
non-parametric tests, examining total investments for rounds 1-12.  
Result 2. The hybrid case does not provide higher investment incentives than the sepa-
rated model. Both the separation and the hybrid cases cause underinvestment with re-
spect to the social optimum, but exceed theoretical predictions from the models.  
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A comparison of theoretical predictions with the investment results from the experiment reveals 
that, in the separation case as well as in the hybrid case, investments clearly exceed the equili-
brium results of the models (separation case: 14,70 > 2, hybrid case: 13,65 > 11). The absence 
of clear discrepancy in our experimental results between vertical separation and the hybrid or-
ganizational structure, as predicted by model-theory, is surprising and can largely be attributed 
to the relatively high investments in the separated model. However, investment in the separation 
case exceeded that of the hybrid case by roughly 1.05 (p = .002). This result was driven partly 
by the final three rounds. A detailed examination of total investment indicates that in 9 of 12 
rounds, average total investments do not differ significantly from each other. Figure 6 further 
reveals a parallel development of total investment in the hybrid and separation cases in rounds 1 
to 7. Whereas, from round 8 onwards, investment in the separation case even increases, invest-
ment in the hybrid case decreases simultaneously.17  
Figure 6. Average Total Investments 
In the single-period treatments, 40 subjects participated in the separated case, 44 in the hybrid 
case and 42 in the integration case. An examination of investments in the single-period treat-
ments yields similar findings to those reported for the multi-period treatments (see Figure 7). 
Although the results seem to match the rank order of theoretical predictions more closely, in-
                                                     
17 This growing discrepancy might originate from some form of last-period effect, as the test participants 
were asked to take part in at least 8 rounds. Last-period effects result in uncooperative player behavior in 
the final rounds of repeated games, because misbehavior cannot be sanctioned. However, since subjects 
were randomly matched with other partners in each round, direct sanctioning was not feasible anyway. 
Nonetheless, F1s might have used underinvestment as a collective sanctioning device, this in fact losing 
credibility with an increasing probability of termination.  
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vestments do not differ significantly between the separation case (12.75) and the hybrid case 
(14.32). Average investments in rolling stock and rail infrastructure of the integration case 
(19.71) remain significantly superior and close to the social optimum. Yet, it is noticeable that 
investments in the first round of the multi-period games – 11.27 in the hybrid case, 11.18 in the 
separated case, and 18.33 in the integrated case – do not reach comparable levels. Thus, to some 
extent, the subjects may have relied on learning-by-doing in the multi-period treatments; this in 
turn indicates some kind of randomness in early-round decisions.  
Figure 7. Total Investments, Single-Period Treatments 
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7. Discussion and Further Results 
The results of our experimental analysis largely confirm the theoretical predictions of invest-
ment behavior in different institutional arrangements in the railway sector. In a world of in-
complete contracts and asset specificity, with respect to specific investments, full vertical inte-
gration is the superior organizational solution. The amounts invested by our respondents were 
closer to the social optimal values than the amounts invested in a hybrid or separated structure. 
However, while investments in the integration scenario almost reach the predicted value and 
investments in the hybrid scenario differ by 23 percent, investments in the separation case sub-
stantially exceed the predicted levels.  
The existence of social preferences may explain this apparent contradiction. In contrast to the 
utility functions of rational and self-interested actors, the utility functions of actors exhibiting 
social preferences also comprise the utility of the exchange partner. One potential out-come 
might be that actors do not consider investments as sunk at the time of negotiation, but expect 
the net benefits from investment to reflect the contribution of each player to the gross surplus, 
that is to investment cost (Homans, 1961; Selten, 1978).  
    
OLS IRLS Robust  Regression 
i1/(i1+i2)  
0.566*** 
(0.071) 
0.777*** 
(0.001) 
Constant  
0.205*** 
(0.356) 
0.110*** 
(0.005) 
N  264 264 
F(1, 262)  63.880*** 8954.460*** 
R²   0.439 0.439 
Dependent variable: F1's share of surplus b. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01. 
Table 3. Estimation Results F1, Separated Model 
An investigation of the bargaining outcomes indicates that, in fact, a significant proportion of 
respondents do index the bargaining behavior to prior investments. In order to test whether equi-
ty theory can contribute to the explanation of observed investment behavior, we estimate the 
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following simple equation: with F1’s share b as the dependent variable and his relative contribu-
tion to the total surplus as the independent variable. Table 3 displays the results of our estima-
tions. We also applied a robust estimation technique to test the robustness of the estimation 
(Hackett, 1993; Hamilton, 1991). Both estimations strongly support the notion that the individu-
al contribution to gross surplus exerts a substantial influence on the outcome of bargaining. 
Hence, social preferences seem to influence investment incentives and might explain the obser-
vation of higher investment levels than those predicted theoretically.  
A further result of our experiment suggests that equal power due to shared ownership, as in the 
separation model, leads to efficiency losses, because of negotiation costs. In the sub-game per-
fect equilibrium, negotiations are successful and immediate, with bargaining terminating after 
the first round with breakdowns generally not being observed. This conclusion is based on the 
assumption of a homogenous group of actors. It follows that, since the sample becomes more 
heterogeneous, this result can no longer be retained, since rational actors might be disciplined 
by those with social preferences. Specifically, it may become rational to deviate from the theo-
retical prediction when confronted with potential and unexpected negotiation breakdowns by 
fair actors. Accordingly, in 24.6 per cent of cases, bargaining proceeds beyond round one. This 
causes efficiency losses of 25.7 per cent. In particular, total investments in all rounds amounted 
to 3.881, which correspond to a net joint profit of 19.405. A profit of only 14.417 could yet be 
realized, due to agreement delays and negotiation break-downs (Joskow, 2003). 
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8. Conclusions 
The present chapter constitutes an initial contribution to the empirical analysis of organizational 
structures and investment incentives in the railway sector. In general, our experimental results 
seem to indicate that, in a world of incomplete contracts, a vertical separation of railways as 
well as hybrid forms might cause deficits in innovation, quality and safety, due to underinvest-
ment in relation-specific assets. Although the levels of investments in the separation and the 
hybrid scenario exceeded the theoretical predictions, they failed to match the social optimum.  
One of the main objectives of the European railways is the re-vitalization of rail traffic, which 
involves strengthening railway competitiveness in an intermodal comparison. The system’s high 
technical and organizational complexity impedes or at least limits the potential for complete 
contracts which cover every conceivable aspect of the transaction. In order to determine which 
organizational structure is most appropriate for macroeconomic purposes, it is of paramount 
importance to consider the numerous effects of these various structures. Not only are incentives 
to invest relevant, but also aspects such as additional synergy effects, economies of scope, com-
petition, subsidies, privatization revenues or the marketability of the railway industry. However, 
the problems that occurred in Great Britain after the railway restructuring process indicate that, 
particularly in this sector, considering the incentives to invest in innovation, quality and safety 
may be a particularly important aspect, and one that has so far been under-rated. 
Our analysis shows that individual profit-maximizing behavior may lead to suboptimal deci-
sions from a macroeconomic perspective, which in turn could constrain the competitive capabil-
ities of European railways. Our results are also of particular importance for the design of hybrid 
models. The case considered here involves the separation of the right to decide on investments 
and the right to control the respective asset within the production process. From this, it follows 
that the investing party did not have any sanctioning potential after the investment had been 
undertaken, which may explain the comparatively low investments in rolling stock. However, 
this constellation constitutes only one possible alternative to designing a hybrid organizational 
form. Consequently, other design options, which could potentially combine the advantages of 
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the pure organizational forms more effectively, should be taken into account. In order to deter-
mine definitively which organizational structure is macro-economically superior, further quan-
titative-oriented research is required, especially to investigate the industrial-economic effects. 
However, it is advisable firstly to analyze the full impact of different organizational structures 
before making policy decisions. 
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 II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NETWORKING*18 
1. Abstract 
This chapter aims at extending the scope of the current discussion on networking activities by 
(1) providing a brief conceptualization of important elements of both networking benefits and 
costs and (2) considering how different networking activity levels may affect optimal institu-
tional choice, taking possible non-linear developments and opportunity costs into account. By 
doing so, one of the main intentions of this chapter is to point to potential downsides of net-
working – an issue that has largely been neglected so far.   
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann. An early version of this chapter was 
presented at the EMNet 2007 Conference in Rotterdam, NL. See: Ehrmann, T. and Schmale, H. (2007), 
The Costs and Benefits of Networking. Working Paper presented at the International Conference on Eco-
nomics and Management of Networks, 2007, Rotterdam, NL. 
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2. Introduction 
“Your true value depends entirely on what you are compared with.” 
Bob Wells 
A fast growing body of literature, emerging from a wide array of academic perspectives, deals 
with the subject of hybrid governance modes, in particular, with network forms of organization 
(for an overview, see Academy of Management Review, Special Issue 2006). This literature 
intends to shed light on the question whether to produce a certain good or service in-house or 
not, thereby addressing a fundamental managerial challenge, i.e., the choice of organizational 
structure. Yet, we feel that one important shortcoming characterizes large parts of the ongoing 
debate on network forms of organization: dysfunctionalities and costs of networking truly re-
main underexplored. In this study, we aim at extending the scope of the current discussion on 
networking activities by (1) providing a brief conceptualization of important elements of both 
networking benefits and costs and (2) considering how different networking activity levels may 
affect optimal organizational choice, taking possible non-linear developments in benefits and 
costs into account. By doing so, one of our main intentions is to point to potential downsides of 
networking – an issue that has largely been neglected so far. 
Previous studies appear to take an overly optimistic perspective on hybrids, mostly focusing on 
beneficial effects of networking (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999; Labianca and Brass, 2006; Pitta-
way et al., 2004). Organizational scholars and sociologists, for instance, often certify network 
forms of organization superior functionality regarding knowledge transfer, resource acquisition, 
and legitimization issues (e.g., Baum and Oliver, 1991; Gulati, 1995; Pillai, 2006; Powell, Ko-
put and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Yet, ignoring dysfunctionalities and costs of networking hinders an 
in-depth understanding of how collective action could be organized effectively (Parkhe, Was-
serman and Ralston, 2006). In the same vein, Podolny and Page (1998: 66) have observed that 
the “attention to the functionality of network forms of organization explains why economic 
actors rely on network forms of organization, but it does not explain why they do not.” Moreo-
ver, they argue that scholars’ widespread approach to concentrate on analyzing the benefits of 
networking might be useful for explaining varying reliance on networks between industries, 
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since the relevance of collaboration-related benefits, such as learning and knowledge transfer, 
could differ from sector to sector. However, it still remains unclear why a considerable fraction 
of actors within an industry may constantly rely on hierarchical governance modes without in-
vesting in network building.  
Although not questioning that networking entails considerable costs (e.g. Burt, 2005), scholars 
have mostly refrained from elaborating on a conceptual or formal framework which incorpo-
rates both the benefits and the costs of networking.19 As a more recent example, Lavie (2006) 
has developed a theoretical model which deals with the formalization of competitive advantages 
derived from access to external resources, i.e., network relations. In extending the resource-
based view of the firm, Lavie contributes to further our understanding of how economic rents 
are generated by applying resources which originate from outside the firm. However, similar to 
other common approaches to understanding networking activities, two important restrictions 
limit the testability as well as the explanatory power of Lavie’s model. First, Lavie implicitly 
assumes a linear-additive relationship between additional shared resources, i.e., a rising number 
of network partners, and a focal firm’s extracted rent. Despite that the author acknowledges that 
network relations might vary in performance, he missed the opportunity to explicitly incorporate 
this fact into his model. This is surprising since recent studies show evidence on non-linear 
relationships between a firm’s network activity level, i.e. the number of network partners, and 
the benefits obtained from external resources (Uzzi, 1996; 1997). The second restriction con-
cerning the Lavie-model is the lack of an explicit cost consideration (Lavie, 2006: 651). Neg-
lecting costs and dysfunctionalities of networking breeds the assumption that networking always 
secures positive rents. Consequently, the following major question emerges: Why do not all 
economic actors perceive networks as a panacea and deliberately choose other organizing 
forms from the outset? 
                                                     
19 The transaction cost approach has been criticized for not explicitly comparing the costs and benefits of 
institutional choice (e.g. Zajac and Olsen, 1993), although Riordan and Williamson (1985) in fact do 
integrate transaction as well as production cost differences within their model. Since transaction costs are 
a key aspect of institutional efficiency in network arrangements, we base significant parts of our argu-
mentation on ideas from TCE.  
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Based on insights from management and social network theory literature, we here take an initial 
step in addressing the questions to which extent and under which circumstances the network 
form of organization represents a superior organizational choice. In a nutshell, we first emphas-
ize that considering both networking benefits and costs is crucial to substantiating the economic 
calculus which underlies a comparative analysis of governance modes. As we will outline in 
detail in the next section, important sources of benefits are knowledge transfer, relation specific 
investments (e.g. in dedicated machinery or human capital), and access to complementary 
and/or scarce resources (e.g. distribution network or reputation). Important costs involved in 
networking are transaction costs, originating from the need to control potentially opportunistic 
partners (e.g., White and Siu-Yun Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1996) and coordination costs related 
to communication and coordination efforts independent from incentive conflicts (Camerer and 
Knez, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001). 
Second, and in line with findings from recent research on networking, we make a strong case for 
non-linearities in the relationship between the degree of collaborative activity and the costs and 
benefits of networking. By doing so, we explicitly account for varying value effects of different 
activity levels within the governance mode of networking since intensity of usage has been re-
vealed as a crucial determinant of optimal institutional choice (Burt, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). 
Third, and finally, the consideration of positive opportunity costs – being defined as foregone 
net benefits from the most attractive alternative resource employment (e.g. Varian, 1997) – is a 
necessary precondition for quantifying the competitive advantage a particular governance form 
actually offers. The disregard of an opportunity cost calculus would impede the comparison of 
alternatively available governance modes, and consequently, the identification of a true compet-
itive advantage.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the general 
economic rationale of the choice of organizational structure. Then in section 4, we turn to the 
sources of networking benefits and furthermore explain how different activity levels can affect 
the potential benefits derived from external relations. Section 5 deals with the sources and non-
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linear developments of networking costs. Moreover, we introduce an opportunity cost calculus. 
In section 6, a simple heuristic model summarizes the ideas and illustrates that too extensive a 
reliance on network resources could raise the attractiveness of the opportunity, implying a com-
petitive disadvantage for interconnected firms. Section 7 concludes.   
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3. Weighing the Benefits and Costs of Networking 
Scholars emphasize that data on alliance failure is hard to obtain, yet, the scarce empirical evi-
dence reports on a very high percentage of interfirm collaborations (more than 50%) which ei-
ther do not operate in the way they are supposed to or even fail (Podolny and Page, 1998; Park 
and Ungson, 2001; Parkhe, 1993). Hence, one should assume that in some cases alternative 
governance modes have become superior relative to the network form in terms of costs and 
benefits, implying a competitive disadvantage for interconnected firms.  
Here, we define a network form of organization as any collection of actors (n ≥ 2) that pursue 
repeated enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes between the actors. In this respect, the network form 
of organization constitutes a discrete organizational form next to markets and hierarchies, with 
distinctive adaptation and control mechanisms (Podolny and Page, 1998; Powell, 1990).  
In particular, trust, i.e., an actor’s confidence that another actor will not exploit its vulnerabili-
ties (Sako, 1992), and reciprocity, i.e., a conditional behavioral pattern that returns ill for ill as 
well as good for good (Axelrod, 1984), are commonly alleged to play decisive roles as gover-
nance mechanisms especially in the network form of organization (Powell, 1990). Moreover, 
networking lays the foundations for the development of social norms. A social norm exists 
when the socially defined right to control an action is held not by the actor but by others (Cole-
man, 1990). Repeated interaction between densely interconnected partners breeds a collective 
understanding of generalized norms of cooperation such as fairness, team-work, or openness, 
for example. Given the danger of collective sanctioning in the case of defection, social norms 
can provide strong incentives for cooperation. 
From any utilization of different means of governance follows both a difference in cost and 
benefit generation. Hence, an analysis of governance forms that concentrates on either benefits 
or costs oversimplifies. In pursuing this notion, Windsperger (1987), for instance, called for a 
combined analysis of costs and benefits from the utilization of different governance modes re-
ferring to the case of franchising where institutional arrangements are sometimes explicitly cho-
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sen for revenue maximization reasons rather than cost-economizing objectives. Thus, for a go-
vernance form to be superior it must be cost-efficient in terms of adapting, coordinating, and 
safeguarding exchanges (e.g. Williamson, 1991), taking differences in benefit generation into 
account (Dyer, 1997; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
 
Figure 8. Decision Framework of Organizational Choice 
Basically, the derivation of a decision rule for the choice of an adequate organization structure is 
straight forward. For instance, if )(eB  denotes the benefits and )(eC  the costs of networking at 
an activity level e, and H the opportunity costs (i.e., net benefits from the next best alternative 
governance mode, see Ch. 5.3), then the focal firm should opt for networking if
HeCeB >− )()(  (see Figure 8). In other words, as long as the benefits associated with choos-
ing the network form exceed the entire costs one incurs by doing so, this is an advantageous 
choice (Frank, 2000). However, as simple as this decision rule appears, as complex the applica-
tion of this rule can get, since in the first place it requires an identification and estimation of the 
involved benefits and (opportunity) costs.  
Net benefits from networking B(e)-C(e)
Opportunity costs calculus H
Net benefits from hierarchy
Choice of organization structure
B(e)-C(e)      H≤>
Networking benefits B(e)
• Substantial knowledge 
transfer & joint learning 
• Asset specialization
• Availability of complementary/
scarce resources
Networking costs C(e)
• Transaction costs 
• Coordination costs
Networking activity level e
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4. The Benefits of Networking 
4.1 Sources of Networking Benefits  
Studying cooperation-related benefits, scholars have highlighted the relevance of aspects such 
as legitimization, learning, risk reduction or the combination of complementary skills (e.g., 
Ahuja, 2000; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). In an attempt to structure the variety of findings, Dyer and Singh (1998) 
established an integrated framework which explains how firms capitalize on collaboration activ-
ities. In particular, important benefits from networking can be subsumed under the following 
broader categories: (1) knowledge exchange and joint learning, (2) investments in relationship-
specific assets and (3) availability of complementary and/or scarce resources. These benefits 
translate into profits either due to production cost-minimizing effects or due to the maximization 
of revenues (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
Perhaps the most emphasized reason for interfirm collaboration is the feasibility of knowledge 
transfer and joint learning (e.g. Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). Albeit ex-
ternal relationships are primarily perceived as a key vehicle for information transfer leading to 
substantial product innovations (e.g., sales partner feedback), they can also be critical for pro-
moting awareness and early adoption of new business practices developed by other organiza-
tions, which might lead to enhanced efficiency (Pittaway et al., 2004: 145). In particular, endur-
ing exchange relations between partners create room for the development of routines allowing 
for the transmission of tacit knowledge, i.e., knowledge which cannot easily be codified and 
transferred via arm’s-length relationships (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Tacit knowledge, that 
component of knowledge which defines the knowing-how rather than knowing-what, is of par-
ticular value since it is difficult to imitate and therefore provides the potential for competitive 
advantages (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Furthermore, information transfer can initiate learning 
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processes which improve the involved firms’ skills to respond to environmental changes, there-
by enhancing adaptation capacities in the face of uncertainty (Pillai, 2006: 132).20 
Both the long-term character of network relations and the distinctive means of governance build 
important foundations for the willingness to pursue partner-specific asset specialization, a wide-
ly recognized source of rent generation (e.g. Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Benefits from in-
vestments in relationship-specific assets arise from substantial productivity gains within the 
entire production process (Williamson, 1985). For instance, physical asset specialization, such 
as the investment in dedicated machinery, can provide potentials for product quality improve-
ments as well as an increase in output due to a reduction of production steps or declining failure 
rates. Both the specializations of human assets, e.g., investments in the accumulation of partner-
specific know-how, and investments in site-specific assets, i.e., the establishment of physical 
proximity, provide quality enhancement and economizing potentials in a similar way (Dyer, 
1997).  
Finally, another widely accepted source of networking benefits is the availability of comple-
mentary and scarce resources, complementary resources being defined as a set of resources 
which collectively generate higher benefits than the sum of benefits obtained from their individ-
ual use (Hamel, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Thereby, the combined resource endowments are 
more valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991) than they had been before they were 
combined (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Some kinds of resources cannot be acquired via market 
transactions or cannot be developed by firms themselves in the short run. For instance, reputa-
tion (Baum and Oliver, 1991), specialized expertise (e.g. access to product development skills), 
or other tacit skills are slow to develop in-house (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hennart, 
1991) and not necessarily available on markets because of indivisibility (Oliver, 1997). Since 
differential historical patterns of firm evolution and path dependencies promote differences in 
organizations’ asset endowments (e.g. Alchian, 1950), needed resources might nevertheless 
                                                     
20 In this context, Uzzi emphasizes fine-grained information transfer as a main advantage of embedded 
relations. “Information exchange in embedded ties is more proprietary and more tacit than the information 
exchanged at arm’s length. It includes strategic and tacit know how that boosts a firm’s transactional 
efficacy and responsiveness to the environment.” (Uzzi, 1996: 678). 
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exist within the network. Hence, interfirm relationships can serve as conduits to provide for 
difficult-to-acquire and complementary assets which provide potentials to enhance a firm’s eco-
nomic performance (Sakakibara, 1997). 
As we will show in more detail below, the potential amount of benefits obtained from network-
ing, i.e. from knowledge exchange, relation-specific investments, and complementary and/or 
scarce resources should crucially depend on the level of networking activity. Possible non-linear 
developments in benefit generation will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2 Non-Linear Development of Networking Benefits  
Numerous studies implicitly assume a monotonically increasing relationship between firms’ 
degrees of interconnectedness and the value effects of additional shared resources. We have 
concerns about this view since several arguments indicate that this assumption may not hold for 
the full range of network activity levels.  
We argue that, at low levels of activity, the potential amount of benefits obtained from network-
ing should be high and potentially increasing in network activity. Generally, the acquisition of 
complementary or scarce resources such as reputation or specialized expertise is valuable to the 
firm. The benefits are supposed to be high at the outset because of a relatively high probability 
that the focal firm gains access to new information and needful resources with every new con-
nection. However, central to taking advantage of a munificent networking environment is the 
capability to locate and to recognize complementary and scarce resources. Growing collabora-
tion experience supports the formation of evaluation and environmental screening capabilities 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Moreover, third-party interaction can enhance the understanding of 
partner-specific capabilities, thereby breeding a collective knowledge of network members’ skill 
endowments. Both the improvement of evaluation and screening capabilities and decreasing 
information asymmetries within the network facilitate the identification of complementary re-
sources and information, potentially leading to a more effective use of network ties and increas-
ing benefits (Argote, McEvily and Reagans, 2003).  
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In a similar vein, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) emphasize that the ability to identify, absorb, and 
exploit external knowledge, i.e., the amount of absorptive capacity, depends on the prior posses-
sion of issue-related knowledge. Interaction with an existing base of partners can enhance the 
accumulation of issue-related knowledge, and consequently, improved absorptive capacity can 
lead to greater effectiveness in knowledge internalization and utilization (Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996).  
Potential gains from relation-specific investments might also rise at the outset. This stems from 
the fact that increasing interaction and a growing number of partners should initially support the 
development of trust and social norms as informal governance mechanisms that safeguard ex-
change in networks.21 Incentives to invest in partner-specific assets generally are tempered by 
the omnipresent danger of exploitation by opportunistic partners (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978). For instance, exploitation might take the form of re-negotiation of pay-off allocation 
agreements after investments are sunk. Hence, underinvestment is the dominant strategy as long 
as there are no sufficient safeguards in place (e.g. Hart, 1995). But when informal safeguards 
become more functional, eventually filling the gaps of necessarily incomplete formal contracts, 
the incentives to underinvest are reduced.22  
However, too high levels of interconnectedness and a too high number of partners might even-
tually lead to reverse effects, implying a high probability of declining benefits after a certain 
threshold of activity levels.  
First, with respect to the access to complementary and scarce resources, higher numbers of net-
work partners may increase the probability that the firm obtains irrelevant or even redundant 
resources (Witt, 2004).23 The same applies for benefits from knowledge exchange: a too large 
                                                     
21 Trust and social norms are built up not only by direct interaction but also via the assessment of poten-
tial partners’ behaviors within third-party interactions (Henrich, 2004; Henrich and Henrich, 2006). 
22 Hart (1995) emphasizes that formal contracts are necessarily incomplete. First, bounded rationality and 
prohibitively high transaction costs prevent from the formulation of complete contracts. Second, informa-
tion asymmetries limit external enforcement of agreements.  
23 Moreover, Podolny and Page (1998) point to the fact that firms are limited in their ability of adapting 
network configuration due to constraints on the dissolution of ties because of reputational costs. As long 
as the ability to from ties with new partners is contingent on the number of preexisting ties (Gulati, 1995), 
a tie which is no longer beneficial might persist for the purpose of signaling good reputation. 
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base of network ties comes along with an increasing grade of information redundancy and inef-
ficiencies in information flows due to overembeddedness, i.e. a too high number of network 
relations, may arise (Uzzi, 1996; 1997).  
Second, a too high number of network partners may hinder an intensive exploitation of connec-
tions, which eventually leads to decreasing benefits from further network extensions. This fol-
lows from limited management capacities (Granovetter, 2005). With an increasing number of 
network partners, the focal firm may fail to maintain adequate (based on partners’ expectations) 
levels of cooperation intensity. Cooperation intensity reflects several dimensions of an exchange 
such as the frequency of contact and the extent to which and what resources and information are 
transferred. Intense relations encourage the exchange of complex and tacit knowledge (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). Moreover, strong relations are reliable in terms of assistance and typically 
allow a better and more frequent recourse to external resources (Burt, 2005). Considering the 
equity rationale underlying reciprocity norms, i.e., an actor in an exchange relation will expect 
the rewards of each party to be proportional to his input (Homans, 1961), external partners are 
likely to respond in terms of low contributions likewise.  
Third, the functionality of social norms and trust as means to safeguard specific investments are 
likely to decrease after a certain threshold of activity levels. In particular, increasing network 
size might lead to the breakdown of informal institutions (Davis, 2006). Granovetter (2005: 34) 
states accordingly that “the larger the group, the lower its ability to crystallize and enforce 
norms”. This in turn might mitigate incentives to invest specifically.  
 
 
  
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NETWORKING 64
 
5. The Costs of Networking 
5.1 Sources of Networking Costs  
Networking costs result from the establishment, maintenance, exploitation, and abandonment of 
exchange relations. Important costs can be subsumed under the broader categories of (1) trans-
action costs, originating from the need to control potentially opportunistic partners and (2) 
coordination costs, related to communication and coordination efforts independent from incen-
tive conflicts. Moreover, our argumentation puts a strong emphasis on the consideration of op-
portunity costs which form another source of networking costs. By reason of its particular im-
portance, the issue of opportunity costs has been dedicated a chapter of its own (Ch. 5.3).  
In order to prevent negative effects due to opportunistic appropriation by external partners, 
firms incur considerable transaction costs in stipulating various formal and informal agreements 
(Williamson, 1985). For instance, partners might tempt to unilaterally reduce efforts in joint 
operations, distort or withhold information, or defect from other kinds of mutual agreements at 
the other firm’s expense (Hart, 1995; Lavie, 2006; Parkhe, 1993). Ex-ante transaction costs 
occur during the initiation process of a transaction, e.g., costs of acquiring information on po-
tential partners, as well as within the contracting process, e.g., costs of negotiating and safe-
guarding an agreement. Ex-post transaction costs stem from monitoring efforts, from potential 
haggling and from ex-post adaptations and re-alignments of agreements due to environmental 
changes (Williamson, 1985). Scholars have argued that network organizations’ reliance on trust 
and commonly shared norms as informal safeguards can translate into significantly lower trans-
action costs as compared to governance modes primarily relying on formal safeguards, such as 
legal contracts (e.g. Dore, 1983; Sako, 1992; Uzzi, 1997). For instance, trust may both lower ex-
ante and ex-post transaction costs by facilitating agreement processes and by lowering monitor-
ing necessities, respectively (Dyer and Singh, 1998). In this vein, Jarillo has argued that “being 
able to generate trust, therefore, is the fundamental entrepreneurial skill to lower those costs and 
make the existence of the network economically feasible” (Jarillo, 1988: 36). However, building 
informal safeguards such as trust and commonly shared norms is costly for itself. It requires a 
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considerable up-front investment of at least time, and trust also needs to be cultivated as the 
relationship matures (Dyer, 1997). The amount of investment into trust-building crucially de-
pends on the parties’ willingness to cooperate and on incentives to defect. In this context, scho-
lars have emphasized the role of network structure as an important determinant of the institu-
tional environment (Burt, 1992; Burt, 2005; Granovetter, 2005; Lorenzen, 2002; Pillai, 2006).24 
Small cohesive networks with low information transfer costs, for instance, can foster the emer-
gence of trust given that reputation leverages group-conform behavior (Henrich, 2004; William-
son, 1996). Here, parties will try to protect their reputation by behaving cooperatively (Burt, 
2005).25 
Coordination costs refer to costs in terms of time, energy or money devoted to both communica-
tion and coordination between autonomous cooperation partners. Even in the absence of any 
opportunism, failures of adaptation may arise because autonomous parties could read external 
signals differently and choose different reactions to these signals, although the parties’ common 
purpose might be to achieve timely and harmonized responses (Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 
2005; Williamson, 1991). Further intensifying the need for alignment between the network 
members, differences in historical patterns and firm evolution are an important reason for diffe-
rential resource endowments, capabilities, and organizational structures. Parties to a transaction 
might face significant communication and coordination efforts intending to overcome these 
organizational incompatibilities (Camerer and Knez, 1997; Park and Ungson, 2001; White and 
Siu-Yun Lui, 2005). Moreover, the more fine-grained specialization gets, the more complex and 
time consuming becomes the task to coordinate individual efforts. Hence, coordination costs are 
primarily driven by interpartner diversity and managerial complexity. 
                                                     
24 Although being frequently criticized for under-emphasizing the role of social norms or trust as gover-
nance mechanisms, this is what Williamson refers to as the institutional environment, acknowledging that 
“in effect, institutional environments that provide general purpose safeguards relieve the need for added 
transaction-specific supports” (Williamson, 1996: 267). In a similar vein, Pittaway et al. state that “incli-
nations towards trust, opportunism, legal contracting and self-interest are all shaped by the institutional 
context in which firms operate” (Pittaway et al., 2004: 157). 
25 However, it is important to notice that the institutional environment is not static but rather evolving, 
subject to network structure and hence networking activity. 
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As we will show in detail below, the amount of costs incurred through networking should de-
pend on the networking activity level. Possible, non-linear developments of networking costs 
are described in the next section before we will turn to the topic of opportunity costs thereafter. 
5.2 Non-Linear Development of Networking Costs  
At low levels of networking activity the costs of networking are supposed to be considerably 
high. A firm that initiates networking activities is likely to have little experience in formal con-
tract negotiation and cannot resort to standardized action patterns in terms of managing external 
relations. Hence, setting up ties that do not have any precedent is very expensive (Burt, 2005). 
Networking firms have to bear costs originating from both the need to control transactions with 
potentially opportunistic exchange partners who might be trying to pursue self-interested objec-
tives and the need to coordinate and align action of independent entities (White and Siu-Yun 
Lui, 2005).  
In particular, firms need to gather a lot of information on the potential partner’s line-up concern-
ing objectives, resource base, cooperation abilities and reputation. Moreover, the omnipresent 
danger of opportunistic behavior implies high demands on transaction safeguards (Williamson, 
1996). Hence, firms try to protect themselves by establishing causal ambiguity, registering 
trademarks, applying for patents or by building other costly isolating mechanisms. The need to 
coordinate action with external partners also implies high costs initially because the firm first of 
all has to establish communication routines, create organizational interfaces, and reorganize 
processes in order to enable joint action with external partners (White and Siu-Yun Lui, 2005). 
Relatedly, Dyer, Kale and Singh (2001) emphasize the importance of a dedicated management 
function as a key instrument for managing external relationships. However, dedicated functions 
imply considerable up-front investments and thus an organizational long-term commitment to 
affiliation strategies. Coordination costs in terms of time and effort devoted to direct interaction 
are also supposed to be high at the outset of any networking engagements. Differences in stra-
tegic goals (Doz, 1988), organizational cultures (Parkhe, 1991), and cognitive patterns have to 
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be identified and resolved by mutual adjustment, which incurs costs in terms of time and efforts 
devoted to communication and coordination (White and Siu-Yun Lui, 2005).  
Initially, coordination and control costs may decline due to the development of efficient routines 
in coordinating partners, and experience effects in contract negotiation and monitoring, for ex-
ample. Moreover, given indirect connections among partners, transaction cost reducing social 
mechanisms such as trust and commonly shared norms may be reinforced (Burt and Knez, 
1995; Henrich and Henrich, 2006; Coleman, 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Lorenzen, 2002). 
Hence, within rather densely interconnected cliques, monitoring and enforcement efforts can to 
some extent be “sourced out” to the network, given an increasing likelihood that non-
cooperative behavior is observed and sanctioned by common partners.26 Consequently, collec-
tive monitoring and sanctioning, e.g., in the form of network exclusion, might reduce the focal 
firm’s monitoring and enforcement costs (Rowley, 1997). Cheap third-party information on 
potential new partners made available by indirect ties might also lead to a reduction in costs of 
information acquisition (Granovetter, 1973).27 
However, at high levels of network activity and with a growing number of links, it is realistic to 
assume that potential gains from experience are more than offset by increasing costs of coordi-
nation. First, increasing specialization raises the level of managerial complexity. Given that 
tasks bear connections to some extent, the focal firm incurs a high amount of costs in terms of 
time and effort to ensure the timely transfer of accurate information to each of the partners in 
case of adaptation, for instance. Second, a large number of partners raise the diversity of organi-
zational configurations within the network, which inevitably leads to higher coordination costs 
when aligning actions. Consequently, after a certain threshold of network activity levels and 
with a growing number of links, the firm should experience higher coordination costs.  
                                                     
26 The likelihood of dense interconnection within the network is maximized for small or moderate group 
sizes. Density is defined as the proportion of ties in a network relative to the total number possible (Was-
serman and Faust, 1994). With growing network size, density decreases because actors are limited in 
management capacity and the number of possible ties increases exponentially (Granovetter, 2005).  
27 In a similar vein, Gulati (1995) found that the ability of network tie formation positively correlates with 
the number of preexisting ties. When searching for adequate affiliates, potential partners might be guided 
by other firms’ histories. In particular, they tend to take the number of prior exchange relations as a refer-
ence for cooperative intentions. 
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A very large network might lead to the breakdown of informal institutions which eventually 
leads to rising costs of control (Davis, 2006). In particular, monitoring each partner’s contribu-
tion, exchanging information on inadequate behavior, and imposing sanctions in the face of 
opportunistic conduct become increasingly time-consuming, since the risk of receiving inaccu-
rate information about what potential partners did in the past raises with growing communities 
(Henrich, 2004). Hence, the lower the ability of the group to enforce norms (Granovetter, 2005), 
the higher may be the need for additional transaction specific safeguards.  
5.3 Opportunity Costs  
Any neglect of positive opportunity costs from alternative resource deployments would imply 
that the analysis of governance choice lacks a tertium comparationis. The consideration of op-
portunity costs is essential to assessing the true cost of any alternative. Conversely, ignoring 
opportunity costs may breed the false impression that its benefits are free of charge, thus leading 
to an erroneous evaluation of an alternative’s actual performance. 
In order to determine the competitive advantage of an interconnected firm, first one has to an-
swer the basic question of what to compare to. Arend and Seale (2005) have emphasized the 
requirement of comparability of resource uses with respect to anticipated risk, financial and/or 
organizational commitment, and strategic objectives when defining an appropriate opportunity 
cost calculus. Hence, the authors propose different benchmarks as potential measures for oppor-
tunity costs. In case of a strategic alliance network, for example, the opportunity might be re-
garded as the net gains from an internal venture, i.e., the establishment of an organizational 
entity being subject to the ultimate authority of the firm and with access to all internal resources 
(Shortell and Zajac, 1988). Similarly, Contractor and Lorange have suggested anchoring the 
evaluation of collaborative efforts to an “internalization” or “go-it-alone” option (Contractor 
and Lorange, 1988) in order to reveal the benefits and costs endemic to cooperative relation-
ships with external partners. Central to this logic is the fact that a firm always has the option to 
approach its strategic objectives independently and to dedicate its resources to internal domains. 
However, this choice could result in somewhat different outcomes, i.e., either higher or lower 
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returns, since networking and hierarchy are not complete substitutes to both the benefit and cost 
side (Conner, 1991; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Williamson, 1985).  
With respect to the cost side, for example, a firm that opts for internalization does not have to 
cope with opportunistic appropriation hazards and organizational and structural incompatibili-
ties – the key cost drivers of networking activity. Certainly, hierarchy also causes transaction 
and coordination costs, yet the nature of these costs differs substantially. First, hierarchy relies 
on force majeure rather than formal contracting and trust-based collaboration as governance 
mechanisms (Williamson, 1985). Consequently, transaction costs do not vary in an activity in-
duced development of commonly shared norms and trust. Second, the “go-it-alone” option does 
not involve the need to handle the wide spectrum of cultures, believes, and organizational struc-
tures which come along with an increasing need for costly communication and coordination 
efforts when synchronizing action within networks (Park and Ungson, 2001). Roughly the same 
logic applies for the benefit side, given the fact that internalization implies being “constrained” 
to internal assets or resources available through market acquisition. Consequently, representing 
a meaningful and rather simple benchmark, hierarchy may serve as a point of reference for eva-
luating the benefits and costs involved in networking and hence for determining an alliance 
network’s superiority and related competitive advantages. In the following, we will summarize 
our ideas on the costs and benefits of networking in a simple heuristic model. 
  
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NETWORKING 70
 
6. A Simple Heuristic Model 
We assume both the costs and the benefits of networking to be a function of the effort devoted 
to distinct managerial network activities (White and Si-Yun Lui, 2005), the effort level being 
represented by the number of commitments (Lavie, 2006). The gradients and the position of the 
benefit and the cost curve are determined by the intermediation environment of the respective 
industry and are thus assumed exogenous. The intermediation environment affects the costs and 
benefits of networking and reflects characteristics such as information asymmetries, competi-
tiveness, and uncertainty (Kali, 2003). Along with our discussion on the non-linear development 
of networking costs, the cost function of networks is defined as u-shaped: 
fdeaeC +−⋅= 2)()( , with f, d ≥ 0 and a, e > 0, where f denotes the lowest possible cost 
level corresponding to the activity level e = d. Accordingly, with regard to the gains of network-
ing, we assume the benefit function to be inversely u-shaped lkegeB +−⋅−= 2)()( , with e, g 
> 0 and k, l ≥ 0, where l denotes the maximum level of benefits from networking at the activity 
level e = k (see Figure 9, left). We deliberately chose simple functions for substantiating the 
development of networking costs and benefits. Further differentiations, e.g., with regards to 
specific components of networking costs and benefits, are of course feasible but would not sig-
nificantly add to the illustration of our arguments. 
Based on this simple framework, the costs of networking are denoted by )(eC , and the benefits 
of networking are denoted by )(eB . The net benefits from networking )()( eCeB −  can now be 
compared to the net benefits H from the use of hierarchy for organizing the same activities. 
Figure 9 (right) graphs the net benefit curves for the two governance modes. When applied to 
the real-life context, one may think of a firm that has to decide on a certain business function, 
such as R&D, either to be organized by using external resources via networking or by choosing 
the internationalization option. Internalizing the respective business activities always offers net 
benefits of H. When opting for networking, the resulting net benefits are determined by the 
number of commitments. 
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Figure 9.  Costs and Benefits of Networking 
The decision rule for organizational choice implies superiority of the network form of organiza-
tion for activity levels between e1 and e2. Here, HeCeB >− )()( applies, which means that the 
benefits of networking exceed the costs of networking insofar as they cover the opportunity 
costs, i.e., the net benefits of hierarchy. However, for HeCeB <− )()( , which corresponds to 
activity levels lower than e1 and higher than e2, interconnected firms are disadvantaged relative 
to those which rely on hierarchical organization. Note that we can certainly think of business 
functions for which the net benefits of networking always fall below the gains one may derive 
from the hierarchical solution. This might particularly be true for activities which concern core 
competencies of the firm, such as costumer acquisition, for example. Furthermore, for the sake 
of the argument H is defined as being constant over all activity levels. However, refining this 
heuristic model one could conceive other cost functions which depend on the activity level. 
The simple heuristic model suggested above illustrates that economic actors might deliberately 
choose other organization structures than networking or might also be indifferent between alter-
native governance modes as a result of a cost-benefit analysis. Most importantly, non-linear 
developments of networking benefits and costs should crucially affect the choice of a reasonable 
activity level within the network form of organization. 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
Our theoretical analysis indicates that there is no linear additive relationship between the con-
nectedness of a firm and the value effects of additional external resources. In conclusion, this 
chapter seeks to encourage a more general approach to network analysis, allowing for opportu-
nity costs of alternatively available forms of governance and non-linearities to affect the value 
of additional shared and non-shared resources. It follows from this perspective that differences 
in rent generation may not only be driven by firm- and relation-specific factors, but particularly 
by networking activity. High activity levels of networking imply declining benefits due to inef-
ficiencies in information flows and scarce management capacity which – in conjunction with 
restricted tie breaking capabilities – might hinder intensive exploitation of connections. Fur-
thermore, when exceeding a certain threshold of network size, the costs of networking rise ex-
ponentially due to increasing costs resulting from coordination efforts.  
Dyer, Kale and Singh (2001) report that 49% of alliances did not have established any kind of 
metric to measure network performance. Considering potential constraints and dysfunctionali-
ties of networking, firms are in the danger of not recognizing rising costs from network exten-
sion which might result in a competitive disadvantage of the interconnected firm. 
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 III. THE IMPACT OF E-WORD-OF-MOUTH ON THE SALES 
DISTRIBUTION IN ONLINE BOOK RETAILING*28  
1. Abstract 
Exploring the long tail phenomenon, we empirically analyze whether online reviews, discussion 
forums, and product recommendations reduce search costs and actually alter the sales distribu-
tion in online book retailing towards equality. By developing an innovative approach, we pro-
vide the first long tail conversion model for the German online market, based on publicly avail-
able sales data. Analyzing a data set containing more than 30,000 different books, we find out 
that e-Word-of-Mouth reduces search costs by facilitating the identification and quality assess-
ment of adequate books. Yet, unconditional quantile regressions reveal differences in the func-
tionality of eWOM with respect to popular and unpopular books. 
  
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann. An early version of this chapter was 
presented at the ICIS 2008 Conference in Paris, F. See: Ehrmann, T. and Schmale, H. (2008), The Hit-
chhiker’s Guide to the Long Tail: The Influence of Online Reviews and Product Recommendations on 
Book Sales – Evidence from German Online Retailing. Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Information Systems, 2008, Paris, F. 
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2. Introduction 
“All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered – the trick is to exploit them.” 
Guy Kawasaki 
While big brick-and-mortar book retailers’ assortments comprise a maximum of approximately 
200,000 books, online retailers like “Amazon” generate more than a quarter of their sales vo-
lume with titles which are positioned beyond the top 200,000 in their sales ranking lists. Hence, 
it could be argued that the real existing book market exceeds the conventional brick-and-mortar 
market by one-third in sales volume. The phenomenon of a high total sales volume of products 
which individually sell a very small number of copies is known as “the long tail”, a term coined 
by Chris Anderson, chief editor of the Wired-Magazine (Anderson, 2006).  
 
Figure 10. The Long Tail of Books 
Traditionally, the world of retailing followed the Pareto principle (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Sime-
ster, 2006). The Pareto principle, also known as 80/20-rule, states that 80 percent of total sales 
are generated by 20 percent of the offered products. Consequently, markets were typically dom-
inated by a winner-take-all mentality. However, the long tail phenomenon suggests that those 
products that sell too little to be accommodated in brick-and-mortar stores are responsible for a 
much higher fraction of total sales than predicted by the Pareto principle. Consequently, the 
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question is whether it is profitable for the supply side to move focus away from hits, i.e. the 
“short head”, towards less popular and more obscure products, i.e. the long tail. 
Both supply-side and demand-side drivers affect the profitability of a long tail strategy. On the 
one hand, online markets feature – as opposed to conventional stores – nearly unlimited shelf 
space (Bianco, 1997; Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2003). From this follows that the opportunity 
costs of listing obscure products converge to zero, eventually making it profitable to list niche 
products (Borenstein and Saloner, 2001). Furthermore, online retailing allows to aggregate geo-
graphically dispersed demand, which has positive effects on the overall sales volume of low-
selling products (Lyster, 1999). On the other hand, the long tail phenomenon is driven by 
changes in consumer behavior. The implementation of powerful search tools and automated 
recommender systems entails declining consumer search costs in terms of opportunity costs of 
time. Thus, it might become more advantageous for consumers not to buy well-known and 
prominently positioned hit products, but to expand search effort in order to find products which 
better match personal requirements and preferences than the mainstream product (e.g. Broniarc-
zyk, Hoyer and McAlister, 1998; Senecal and Nantel, 2004).  
Long tail theory’s prediction with respect to the market is that obscure products, which lack the 
high awareness of hit products among buyers, will profit disproportionately high from search 
cost reductions. Hence, declining consumer search costs will even out demand between popular 
and niche products, thereby leading to reduced demand inequity, and to a further flattening of 
the sales distribution (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith, 2003; Brynjolfsson et al., 2006).  
In recent years, researchers have begun to reveal the determinants of long tail formation in more 
detail (e.g. Brynjolfsson et al., 2006; Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan, 2006). In particular, and most interesting to our research, scholars and practition-
ers emphasized the relevance of user-generated online reviews and discussion forums for driv-
ing demand down the tail by reducing product quality uncertainty (e.g. Kawasaki, 2006). How-
ever, despite this widespread belief there still is only sparse empirical evidence on the effective-
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ness of e-Word-of-Mouth (eWOM) instruments for reducing search costs in the long tail, and 
particularly, on their role in changing the sales distribution. 
In this study, we empirically analyze the effects of online reviews, discussion forums, and au-
tomated product recommendations on the demand of individual products and the overall distri-
bution of sales. Using weekly data of over 30,000 books from Germany’s biggest online book 
retailer, Amazon.de, we fit unconditional quantile regression models (Firpo, Fortin and Le-
mieux, 2009) in order to explore the effects of eWOM on the sales distribution. This new re-
gression method allows for evaluating the impact of explanatory variables on the unconditional 
distribution of an outcome variable and thus permits to draw individual conclusions with respect 
to the influence of these variables on the long tail and the short head, respectively.  
One major challenge in analyzing the determinants of long tail formation is to estimate actual 
demand levels from corresponding sales ranks, since proprietary sales data typically is hard to 
obtain. However, using an innovative approach based on publicly available sales data, we pro-
vide the first estimation of a long tail conversion model inferring actual demand levels for ob-
scure products from corresponding sales ranks for the German book market.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we will give an overview of the 
theoretical background and introduce our research questions as well as our hypotheses. Second, 
we describe the data. Third, we estimate the long-tail conversion model. Fourth, we introduce 
the methodology as well as the model specifications and present the results of our empirical 
tests. Finally, we discuss our key results and conclude. 
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3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
3.1 Search Costs and the Long Tail  
Analyzing the U.S. VHS and DVD market Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that a 
supply-sided broadening of the product range indeed comes along with an increasing popularity 
of niche products. Nevertheless, such broadening also implies a very high number of titles 
which rarely sell at all. This might constitute a non-negligible expense factor for retailers pur-
suing a long tail strategy. Hence, another fundamental prerequisite for the successful implemen-
tation of a long tail strategy – other than broadening the assortment to a maximum diversified 
product range – is the reduction of demand-side search costs (Anderson, 2006; Chernev, 2006; 
van Herpen and Pieters, 2007).  
First empirical evidence indicates that search costs decline in the internet channel compared to 
conventional channels like catalogue retailing (Brynjolfsson et al., 2006). Interpreting product 
search as a two-staged process of (1) identification of products and (2) assessment of fit be-
tween the product’s characteristics and a consumer’s quality and functional requirements (Stig-
litz, 1989), there are two main classes of setting levers for reducing search costs.  
First, search costs emanating from attempts to identify potential products can be reduced by 
developing specialized search filters and automated recommender systems which provide per-
sonalized information to customers (Ansari, Essegaier and Kohli, 2000; Häubl and Trifts, 2000). 
For instance, Amazon provides on most of the books’ web pages information on other books 
that have been co-purchased by other customers. Following these product recommendation 
links, customers possibly locate formerly unknown but adequate products with a higher proba-
bility than by random search, thereby incurring lower search costs due to less total time spent 
searching. Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan (2006) provide empirical evidence on the influ-
ence of Amazon’s co-purchase network on product sales concentration. Relatedly, Chen, Wu 
and Yoon (2004) find that product recommendations improve sales more for less popular books 
than for more popular books at Amazon.com.  
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Second, search costs can be reduced by implementing instruments which are targeted toward 
reducing quality uncertainty. As described above, product recommendations foster demand for 
niche products. However, a prominent position in the co-purchase network necessitates that a 
high number of customers previously bought the product in a bundle with a more prominent 
good. Actually, most of the niche products are per definition not rated by the purchase behavior 
of the broad customer mass. As Guy Kawasaki (2006: 1) puts it: “this is where two cool con-
cepts butt head: long tail vs. wisdom-of-the-crowds.” On the contrary, online customer reviews 
can support the assessment of obscure products by providing more detailed information on the 
products’ characteristics even though very few copies have previously been sold. That is to say, 
one sole antecedent purchase and review post can potentially help to reduce the perceived risk 
of wasting time and money on inadequate products (Anderson, 2006; Bakos, 1998; Kawasaki, 
2006; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan, 2006). With regard to a long tail strategy, reviews 
are of high economic relevance due to their cost efficiency, since this form of community con-
tent requires relatively low maintenance compared to retailer self-provided product information. 
Among long tail scholars, there is widespread belief that with respect to the demand side of the 
market, decreasing transaction costs come along with an increasing heterogeneity in consump-
tion patterns (e.g. Brynjolfsson et al., 2006; Hervas-Drane, 2007). Theory argues that consumers 
benefit from increasing product variety in being able to buy products that better match personal 
preferences than conventional mainstream products. As the number of easily accessible offer-
ings increases, it becomes more likely that adequate products will be found (e.g. Broniarczyk et 
al., 1998; Chernev, 2003).29 If this is true, the Pareto sales distributions of brick-and-mortar 
markets reflect – the long tail view holds – suboptimal choices from an individual perspective to 
some extent. Hence, it is the “consumers’ appetite for niche products” (Elberse and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006: 4) which constitutes a prerequisite for a lucrative long tail to emerge.  
Based on long tail theory’s basic assumptions, Brynjolfsson et al. (2006) develop a theoretical 
model that illustrates the effects of a demand-side search cost reduction on sales concentration. 
                                                     
29 Moreover, theory argues that consumers benefit from large assortments through increased choice flex-
ibility in the face of changing preferences and improved support of variety-seeking behavior (Boyd and 
Bahn, 2009; Chernev, 2006; Kahn and Lehmann, 1991).  
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Key to the model is the fact that products differ ex ante in search costs. On the one hand, “key” 
products which are heavily promoted by expensive marketing campaigns generate lower search 
costs since these products entail a high awareness among consumers. On the other hand, pur-
chasing niche products involves high search costs because these products are not visible per se. 
The assumption of heterogeneous search costs implies a change in sales dispersion as a result of 
a search cost reduction. In contrast, if products were assumed to be homogeneous, a reduction in 
search costs should affect all products equally, implying a stable sales concentration.  
In our research setting, we allow for the fact that products might differ ex ante in search costs. 
Consider for example products that stand out of the broad mass due to the fact that they have 
been reviewed in TV shows or have been dragged into the spotlight by literary awards. In con-
trast, niche products are commonly not subject to heavy advertising or promotion campaigns, 
and consequently, there are only few, if any, other sources of information available. Conse-
quently, user generated online reviews – or e-Word-of-Mouth generally – should be especially 
influential on the sales of these obscure products since this is the only source of information 
available (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). 
3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
We analyze whether user generated online reviews, discussions and recommendations can help 
to reduce search cost and whether these instruments in fact foster a shift in consumption patterns 
away from hits to the niche. If this is the case, we should observe non-uniform effects – in the 
sense of strength or direction of influence – of those instruments on sales across books with 
respect to their ranking. In particular, we pose following global research questions: 
(1)  Do customer reviews, discussion forums and product recommendations affect sales in 
general? 
(2)  Do customer reviews, discussion forums and product recommendations alter the sales 
distribution towards equality?   
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Some empirical evidence has been provided by scholars on the basic influence of online cus-
tomer reviews, or generally, eWOM, on sales (e.g. Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). On the one 
hand, eWOM can create customer awareness and on the other hand it may be one of the only 
sources of information about the quality of experience goods (Li and Hitt, 2004; Senecal and 
Nantel, 2004), i.e. products which cannot be assessed prior to consumption (Akerlof, 1970). 
Hence, as customers face high risk to waste money and time on inadequate products, they might 
rely on other customers’ prior experiences in order to reduce quality uncertainty.  
However, customer ratings as a measure of product quality have been controversially discussed 
in the literature. For example, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003a; 2003b), Chevalier and Mayzlin 
(2006), Li and Hitt (2004) and Dellarocas, Awad and Zhang (2004) show that the average rating 
– Amazon’s review system allows for customer ratings on a five-point scale – significantly af-
fects product sales. In contrast, Chen et al. (2004) and Liu (2006) prove positive influence by 
the number of reviews posted rather than the reviews’ valences. Hu, Pavou and Zhang (2007) 
ascribe this inconsistency of findings with regard to review valence to the fact that the average 
rating might be a skewed measure for quality. They show that reviews are not normally distri-
buted over the five-point scale but j-shaped, implying a very high number of positive reviews, a 
smaller number of negative reviews, and an even smaller number of medium reviews. One poss-
ible explanation for the low number of medium ratings is the under-reporting bias, which im-
plies that review posting requires a certain involvement by the customer. This involvement in 
turn is higher when a product is either really appreciated or disliked. The high number of posi-
tive reviews can be attributed to a purchasing bias. Most reviewers ex-ante seem to have a posi-
tive attitude towards the product they review, because they have obviously purchased it. As a 
consequence, customers might display a negativity bias in assigning higher credibility to nega-
tive rather than positive reviews because of their rare occurrence (Sen and Lermann, 2007). 
With regard to the literature, we try to disentangle the effects of review valence by explicitly 
accounting for differences in the influence of negative and positive reviews. Hence, with respect 
to review valence we pose following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1a. A high fraction of good reviews positively influences the title’s sales. 
Hypothesis 1b. A high fraction of bad reviews negatively influences the title’s sales. 
Because of its experience good character buying a book can constitute a rather complex situa-
tion. As noted above, people might index their expectations regarding fit and quality of the book 
to consumer reviews. However, the interpretation of feedback and the assessment of its useful-
ness in many cases require a certain amount of prior knowledge on the topic or the author, for 
instance. Moreover, as the consumption of books is also characterized by an affective and sen-
sory experience of aesthetic or sensual pleasure (Hirschman and Holbrook, 1982) – i.e. reading 
targets on satisfying emotional wants – reviews are subjective and thus depend on the individual 
emotional constitution of the reviewer. As this constitution can hardly be assessed by potential 
buyers, it is difficult to appraise whether the evaluation applies to oneself (Sen and Lermann, 
2007). Consequently, people might try to cope with this situation by transforming the complex 
context into a rather simple decision rule. In particular, they might orientate themselves to the 
number of review posts as an indicator for reviewer involvement and popularity of the book. 
However, it is natural to assume that the magnitude of the positive impact of additional reviews 
might be decreasing for higher numbers of reviews.  
Hypothesis 2a. A high number of customer reviews positively influence the title’s sales. 
Hypothesis 2b. The magnitude of the positive impact is decreasing for higher numbers of re-
views.  
Another possibility to cope with uncertainty in terms of feedback credibility and applicability is 
to rely on opinion leaders. Since top reviewers possess an above-average history of helpful re-
views, customers might impute certain knowledge to them which comes along with higher cre-
dibility. Moreover, books often have a symbolic character, i.e. people read books in order to 
appeal cultured or literate. Hence, people face the risk of reading the “wrong” books and conse-
quently might prefer books which top reviewers have found worth reading: 
Hypothesis 3. Being reviewed by a top reviewer positively influences the title’s sales. 
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Due to the social nature of people books play an important role as means of social interaction. 
That is, people seem to be devoted to hear the same music, watch the same movies and read the 
same magazines and books (Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). One theoretical explanation for 
this fact is that utility derived from e.g. reading – at least to some extent – depends on the ability 
to appreciate it. This ability in turn improves with the accumulation of author or topic specific 
consumption capital. Put differently: The more you know, the more you appreciate it (Stigler 
and Becker, 1977). Consumption capital thereby can be accumulated either by consuming books 
of the same author or of related topics or by discussions with others. Since it is costly to search 
for someone to interact with, people might prefer reading books with visible ‘user communities’ 
because it becomes more likely to find interaction partners. Furthermore, large user communi-
ties indicate high involvement and thus might convince that the book is worth reading. Hence, 
with respect to the relationship between discussions and sales we pose the following research 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Being discussed positively influences the title’s sales.  
Providing community content is one strategy to reduce customer uncertainty involved in buying 
experience goods. Another more and more frequently pursued strategy is to enable free trial. 
Specifically, retailers provide reading excerpts (e.g. the first twenty pages of a book). The ex-
cerpts allow for relatively unbiased quality assessment by the customer und thus might contri-
bute to search cost reduction: 
Hypothesis 5. Featuring a reading excerpt positively influences a title’s sales. 
As already noted, automated recommender systems can reduce search costs by simplifying the 
identification of adequate books. In this respect, a book’s network position on a retailer’s e-
commerce site influences the amount of traffic which is being directed to the product’s detail 
page. The network position thereby is determined by the books it links to, and those that link to 
it. However, books that are either linked to by one or more popular books or by a high number 
of moderate-sellers are likely to enjoy an increase in sales on account of improved customer 
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traffic. Put differently, the book should “enter” more potential buyers’ individual choice sets. 
Besides that, product links do not only entail higher traffic levels but they might also provide 
implicit content information because they allow customers to relate unknown books to some-
thing they possibly know. Hence with respect to automated recommendation links we deduce 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6. Being exposed to high network influence positively impacts the title’s sales. 
As discussed in the previous section, long tail theory argues that reducing search costs fosters a 
shift in sales concentration – away from hits to the niche. The rationale behind this is the fact 
that books are not homogeneous with respect to search cost. In particular, hits feature a higher 
awareness among customers due to the general availability of various information sources such 
as bestseller lists, newspaper reviews, advertising and so on. Consequently, community content 
(i.e. reviews and discussions), recommendations and excerpts should play a much more impor-
tant role for sales success in the long tail where search costs are high. Hence we deduce: 
Hypothesis 7. Community content (i.e. reviews and discussions), recommendations and reading 
excerpts have greater impact on sales in the tail of the sales distribution. 
And, relatedly: 
Hypothesis 8. Community content (i.e. reviews and discussions), recommendations and reading 
excerpts alter the sales distribution towards equality. 
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4. Data and Summary Statistics 
Using Perl-based scripts, we collected individual characteristics, review data, and network in-
formation of initially 56,744 books at the public website of Amazon.de, Germany. Since we did 
not have access to Amazon’s real sales data, we tried to select a representative sample as fol-
lows:30 
First, we chose Amazon’s bestseller lists – each main category has its own hit list – as a starting 
point for our data collection in order to make sure that the sample contains a sufficient amount 
of popular titles. Hence, we collected 9,600 titles across all 22 main categories. In order to dig 
deeper into the long tail, we furthermore added a random generator based sample of 10,000 
books from the German “Books in Print” directory.31 Since a large fraction of sales are concen-
trated in a small fraction of books (Greco, 1997), the probability of extracting niche titles was 
very high. However, we also wanted to collect information on product recommendations, but 
the co-purchase link network is a directed graph, i.e., it is possible to collect all the subsequent 
books one title refers to but it is not possible to identify all precedent books which refer to a 
title. Thus, we took the following approach to draw our main sample: Amazon.de provides up to 
six co-purchase links on every book’s detail page (see for example book A and B in Figure 11). 
  
Figure 11. Examples of Co-Purchases of Books A and B 
We added all co-purchase links of our initial sample of 19,600 books thereby broadening the 
sample size to 56,744 different titles with co-purchase information (books C to K in Figure 11). 
In addition to this we collected following data for each of the books in our sample: isbn (unique 
                                                     
30 This systematic conforms to the common method of data collection (e.g. Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). 
31 See  “Verzeichnis lieferbarer Buecher”, www.vlb.de. 
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serial number), title, author, price, ship time, release date, format, publisher, and a set of differ-
ent review variables.  
Furthermore, we tried to control for other sources of “visibility” which could explain the varia-
tion in sales: (1) a dummy indicating whether a book appeared in one of the three leading Ger-
man literature TV shows in the month before data collection, (2) a dummy indicating whether 
an author received a literary prize within the last three years (“Georg Büchner Prize”, “Ingeborg 
Bachmann Prize”, “Peace Prize of the German Book Trade”, “Noble Prize in Literature”, “Pu-
litzer Prize”), and (3) whether a book was published by one of the 50 biggest publishing houses 
as an indicator for marketing budgets. 
Finally, we collected the sales rank of each book. The top-selling book at Amazon.de has a sales 
rank of one, the lower sellers are assigned higher sequential ranks. Inspections of data as well as 
buying experiments, which we have conducted, indicate that sales ranks are updated several 
times a day.32 For the data collection this poses issues. Frequently changing ranks imply signifi-
cant variations in sales ranks within one day. For example, a book which is ranked around 
150,000 can move up to rank 20,000 as a result of a sale of one. Thus, collecting sales ranks 
resembles shooting at moving targets. Consequently, we collected sales rank data on each of our 
books twice a week in a four week period between March 10 and April 4, 2008. We computed 
an average rank for each title based on eight observations which should represent a sufficient 
approximation of weekly sales ranks (Rosenthal, 2008). We excluded all books which were not 
represented by eight observations in our database. Due to missing data, our analysis is based on 
268,872 observations for 33,609 different books at Amazon.de.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
32 This accounts for both high-selling books and those whose ranks are far beyond 100,000. Ranks are 
changing at least every two hours. 
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 Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
0. Sales ranks 108,270.500 160,938.300 1 2,710,877 
1. Fraction of 5-star ratings 0.446 0.409 0 1 
2. Fraction of 1-star ratings 0.039 0.125 0 1 
3. Number of reviews 6.895 31.689 0 2,569 
4. Top reviews (dummy) 0.195 0.396 0 1 
5. Discussions (dummy) 0.013 0.111 0 1 
6. Reading excerpt (dummy) 0.158 0.365 0 1 
7. Link value 19.279 88.109 0 3,884.360 
8. Price 15.787 14.342 2 980 
9. Ship time 0.422 1.490 0 35 
10. Paperback (dummy) 0.663 0.473 0 1 
11. Weeks since release 188.452 203.926 0 5,639.286 
12. TV appearance (dummy) 0.000 0.012 0 1 
13. Top50 publisher (dummy) 0.285 0.451 0 1 
14. Literary prize (dummy) 0.001 0.023 0 1 
N = 33,609.    
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 displays the summary statistics of our sample. Sales ranks vary between 1 and 
2,710,877. 19.5 percent of titles had a rating by a top reviewer. The mean of average star rating 
is 4.3 (s.d. 0.79) indicating that reviews are very positive on average, which is in line with pre-
vious findings (e.g. Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Hu et al., 2007). 72.4 percent of the books in 
our sample had at least one review posted. On average, each book has 6.9 reviews. 
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5. Long Tail Conversion Model for Estimating Sales 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) and Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003a) find that the relationship be-
tween sales ranks and sales at Amazon.com is approximately log-linear constituting a power-
law distribution: ln[salesi] = β0 + β1 ln[ranki]. Using proprietary sales data from a publisher, 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) calibrate the relationship between sales and sales ranks by estimating 
β0=10.526 and β1=-0.871 for Amazon.com. Most empirical work using publicly available data 
resorts to these parameters for estimating sales. This seems to be appropriate for studies based 
on the American market; however, these parameters are less suitable when analyzing consumer 
behavior in other countries. Here, this model would obviously overestimate sales of books, tak-
ing into account that the American market exceeds the German approximately by a factor of 
four. Consequently, we estimated our own conversion model, which should be more suitable for 
the data from Amazon.de.33 Since we did not have access to proprietary data we took another 
approach: Amazon.de provides information on remainder of stock for books which they have 
five or less copies left. This information is updated several times a day. We extracted all the 
books within our database which had this information displayed and checked stock variations 
and corresponding sales rank variations five times a day for a seven-day period in order to com-
pute weekly sales and sales ranks. 
Our initial sample contained 14,089 books of which about 6,000 exposed variations in the re-
mainder of stock. We excluded all titles which had positive variations in stock and all those 
which had less than one copy left at the end of day seven. We did this to ensure that the varia-
tion in sales ranks can be related to variations in stock, since Amazon.de does not stop selling a 
product which is not in stock. Further minimizing potential effects of unobserved replenishment 
we excluded all titles from the sample that displayed declining sales ranks but either no varia-
tion in stock or positive variation (i.e. sale and replenishment within the same 2½ hours) during 
                                                     
33 In a narrow sense, the log-linear relationship between sales ranks and sales is an assumption. However, 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2003), Schnapp and Alwine (2001), Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003a) and Rosenthal 
(2008) all find that this relationship is approximately log-linear for the American book market. Hence, we 
follow the literature and assume that this relationship applies to the German book market as well. 
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the collection period. Finally, we excluded all titles with increasing ranks (i.e. no sale) and posi-
tive variation in stock (i.e. replenishment) within the collection period. 
Our final sample contained 540 books with weekly sales between one and four books and aver-
age rankings between 53,193 and 959,888. The mean number of sales was 1.44 and the mean 
average rank was 163,322. Table 5 shows our regression results.  
Method: OLS coefficients s.e. 
Ln(average rank) -0. 656*** (0.043) 
Constant 8. 114*** (0.516) 
N 540  
F 235.518***  
Adjusted R2 0.30  
Dependent variable: Ln(sales). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels (2-
tailed): ***p<0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.1. 
Table 5. Long Tail Conversion Function 
We estimated β0=8.114 and β1=-0.656. The model is highly significant, although the R2 is not 
as high as expected. Rosenthal (2008) reports that Amazon.com’s new ranking system includes 
own sales as well as third party sales, which could be an explanation for this value. A limitation 
of this approach is the fact that we relied on long tail data. In particular, small errors with re-
spect to the log-normal parameters which were estimated in the tail of the curve might be mag-
nified significantly near the head of the curve, possibly leading to wrong estimates for the top 
sellers. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that our estimates fit quite well: Welt-Online (2008) 
reports that the book “Wetlands” (i.e. the No.1-seller in our sample) should have sold 3,100 
units per week at Amazon.de within our collection period. Our model estimates weekly sales of 
3,341; this implies an accuracy of 93 percent for the top selling book. However, without having 
proprietary data this should be an adequate estimation of Amazon.de’s sales.34  
  
                                                     
34 The summary statistics for the variable sales are: mean=5.844; s.d.=29.977; min.=0.2; max.=3,440.91. 
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6. The Impact of Reviews and Recommendations on the Sales 
Distribution: Empirical Test 
6.1 Methods and Model Specifications 
OLS-Regression. To estimate the influence of online reviews, discussion forums, and product 
recommendations on sales we specified the following general form model:  
(1)             y = x’β+ε 
The response variable is the actual demand of books, log sales, according to our previously in-
troduced conversion model. The vector x of covariates is specified as follows:  
First, we included a set of review variables: fraction of 5-star reviews, fraction of 1-star reviews, 
number of reviews, a dummy variable indicating whether a top-reviewer occurs on the books 
main page, and a dummy for discussion posts. Furthermore, we included a dummy for reading 
excerpts. 
Second, we included the network’s immediate influence on a book due to recommendations. 
This variable, link value, is a score which depends on both the number of recommendations (i.e. 
links) a book receives and the quality of these recommendations in terms of demand of the pre-
ceding books (Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan, 2006). 
Finally, we considered a set of control variables including book characteristics: price, ship time, 
format (paperback dummy), number of weeks since the book was released, TV appearance, a 
Top50 publisher and a literary prize dummy. 
Unconditional Quantile Regression. An important shortcoming of ordinary least squares regres-
sion – at least in this context – is that it does not allow for drawing conclusions with respect to 
possible changes of the sales distribution as a result of asymmetric impact of eWOM instru-
ments. To the contrary, OLS estimates a conditional mean function that describes how the mean 
of Y changes with a covariate X, and thus intends to deliver the “true value” around which Y 
fluctuates due to an erratic component. A basic assumption here is that the error has the same 
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distribution whatever values may be taken by X. This is referred to as the pure location shift 
model assuming that X affects only the location of a conditional distribution, not the scale or 
other aspects of its distributional shape (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
Yet, we actually expect eWOM to vary in impact on books across the sales distribution and, 
consequently, resulting estimates of OLS regressions are not necessarily indicative for the 
strength or direction of effects on the lower tail of the distribution.  
Previous literature has commonly used conditional quantile regression models in order to meas-
ure the impact of explanatory variables on distributional statistics that go beyond the mean. 
Within theses models, a specified conditional quantile of the response variable is expressed as a 
linear function of observed covariates. Consequently, this method intends to shed light on how 
the entire distribution changes with certain independent variables (e.g. Koenker and Hallock, 
2001). 
However, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, a useful feature of OLS regressions is that 
they provide consistent estimates of the impact of an explanatory variable, X, on the population 
unconditional mean. Hence, estimates can be used to measure the impact on the mean of Y of 
e.g. increasing every observation’s X by one unit, holding everything else constant. On the con-
trary, estimates obtained from conditional quantile regressions cannot be used to estimate the 
impact of X on the unconditional distribution. This stems from the fact that conditional quantiles 
do not average up to their unconditional population counterparts, which is true for conditional 
means.35 Referring to the fact that conditional quantile regressions only measure the effects of 
the covariates on within-group dispersion (where the groups consist of observations that share 
the same values of the covariates X) Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) propose a new regression 
method called unconditional quantile regression. In addition to capturing within-group effects 
measured by conditional quantile regressions it also captures between-group effects.36 This new 
                                                     
35 For further details see Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). 
36 Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) give an excellent numerical example of the difference between with-
in- and between-group effects. Consider following simple example applied to our context: Suppose re-
views (e.g. measured as a binary variable) have a positive impact on log sales and the effect estimated 
using conditional quantile regression is stronger in the 10th than in the 90th percentile. This finding 
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method basically consists of running simple OLS regressions of a transformation – the recen-
tered influence function (RIF) – of the outcome variable on the explanatory variables. The RIF 
for the quantile qτ is formally defined as  
(2)        ܴܫܨሺܻ; ݍఛሻ ൌ ݍఛ ൅
ఛିூሺ௒ஸ௤ഓሻ
௙ೊሺ௤ഓሻ
 
with qτ=Qτ(Y) being the τth population quantile of the unconditional distribution of Y. fY is the 
marginal density function of Y and I is an indicator function. The RIF is simply just a dichotom-
ous variable that takes on the value qτ – (1 – τ)/fY(qτ) when y is below the quantile qτ, and the 
value qτ + τ/fY(qτ) when y is above the quantile qτ. The sample analog of the RIF is defined as 
(3)        ܴܫܨሺܻ; ݍఛෝ ሻ ൌ ݍఛෝ ൅
ఛିூሺ௒ஸ௤ഓෞሻ
௙ೊ෢ሺ௤ഓሻ
 
where ݍఛෝ  is the τth sample quantile and ௒݂෡  is the kernel density estimator. Note that the mean of 
the RIF is the quantile qτ itself.  
If reviews and recommendations in fact foster a change of the sales distribution towards equality 
– as the long tail view suggests – we should observe the respective coefficients increase for 
some quantiles τ in the lower tail of the unconditional sales distribution. That is, reviews, rec-
ommendations and discussion forums should have higher impact on less popular titles (e.g. 
Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). 
6.2 Empirical Results: OLS  
Table 6 displays the results of the OLS regression.37 Overall, the results indicate that the fraction 
of 5-star reviews, the number of reviews, discussions and reading excerpts have significantly 
positive effects on demand, thereby corroborating hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3, H4 and H5. This 
indicates that the implementation of e-Word-of-Mouth instruments is of relevance for demand. 
                                                                                                                                                           
means that reviews reduce within-group dispersion, i.e. the sales dispersion of books with reviews. How-
ever, this does not necessarily mean that increasing the rate of reviewed titles reduces overall sales disper-
sion with respect to the unconditional distribution. This is linked to the fact that reviews increase the 
conditional mean of sales of reviewed titles, which creates a gap between otherwise comparable reviewed 
and non-reviewed books. This is an inequality enhancing between-group effect.  
37 The examination of variance inflation factors and condition indices indicate that the assumption of non-
multicollinearity is not violated (Hair et al., 1998). 
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The quadratic number of reviews term is significant and negative, as expected, but of negligible 
impact.38 The results also support H6 as books which receive more and qualitatively better rec-
ommendations by other books in the network have higher sales. As expected, H1b is supported 
by the data as the fraction of 1-star reviews significantly suppresses sales.  
Method: OLS coefficients s.e.  
Fraction of 5-star ratings 0.416*** (0.009) 
Fraction of 1-star ratings -0.226*** (0.026) 
Number of reviews 0.010*** (0.001) 
Number of reviews2 -0.000*** (0.000) 
Top reviews (dummy) 0.130*** (0.011) 
Discussions (dummy) 0.490*** (0.051) 
Reading excerpt (dummy) 0.088*** (0.011) 
Ln(link value) 0.376*** (0.004) 
Price -0.006*** (0.001) 
Ship time -0.044*** (0.003) 
Paperback (dummy) -0.052*** (0.010) 
Weeks since release -0.000*** (0.000) 
TV appearance (dummy) 1.873*** (0.251) 
Top50 publisher (dummy) 0.076*** (0.008) 
Literary prize (dummy) 0.426** (0.170) 
Constant 0.307*** (0.020) 
N 33,609 
F 1634.22*** 
R2 0.54 
Dependent variable: ln[sales]. Significance levels (2-tailed): 
***p<0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.1. Robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. 
Table 6. Empirical Results OLS Regression 
 
                                                     
38 Hair et al. (1998) propose different methods for measuring curvilinear effects, i.e. transformations of 
the variables and the inclusion of polynomials. We chose a quadratic term in order to allow for a straight 
forward interpretation of the results with respect to the effects of adding additional reviews.  
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Turning to the control variables: Table 6 shows that the variables price, ship time, paperback 
format and age of a title have significant negative impacts on sales. A book’s TV appearance 
has a positive effect on sales as well as the fact whether a title was published by a big publisher. 
Books from award winning authors also generate higher sales, as expected.  
6.3 Empirical Results: Unconditional Quantile Regression  
Table 7 shows the results of our unconditional quantile regressions for quantiles ranging from 
τ=0.10 to τ=0.90. 
With respect to the influence of customer reviews on the sales distribution, we obtain mixed 
results. In particular, positive reviews are highly influential in the tail of the sales distribution, 
and the positive impact of 5-star reviews decreases from the lower tail to the middle of the sales 
distribution. However, this development is reversed from the 40th quantile on, i.e. the positive 
impact of 5-star reviews increases. Yet, from the 80th to 90th quantile the coefficient drops to its 
minimum (coeff.=0.357, s.e.=0.028). 
Conversely, negative reviews loose in impact with ascending sales ranks (i.e. in the long tail), as 
the coefficient of 1-star reviews indicates. Moreover, in the lowest quantile, the coefficient 
changes sign indicating that even a bad review is better than having none in terms of sales. In 
the mid and top quantiles, negative reviews significantly suppress sales, as expected.  
However, as reported in the summary section, reviews are very positive on average (mean of 
star rating: 4.3). Hence, the findings with regard to the effects of positive reviews might indicate 
that increasing the proportion of reviewed books fosters a shift towards more equal sales in the 
long tail but an increase in the sales concentration in the mid quantiles. In order to measure the 
effect of increasing the proportion of reviewed books, holding everything else constant, we ran 
further regressions omitting the review variables and therefore including a review dummy. The 
results basically corroborate the u-shaped development.  
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The review dummy coefficient decreases in impact from the lower to the mid quantiles (τ=0.10: 
coeff.=0.478, s.e.=0.015; τ=0.40: coeff.=0.375, s.e.=0.010) and then increases from the 40th to 
the 70th quantile (coeff.=0.408, s.e.=0.014). Consequently, our results support theory in so far as 
they imply that an increase of the proportion of reviewed books fosters a reduction of sales dis-
persion in the long tail, however, in the mid quantiles, this has a steepening effect on the sales 
distribution. 
Turning back to Table 7, review volume has a positive impact on sales throughout the whole 
distribution of book sales. Yet, in contrast to H7, which postulates lower impact of reviews in 
the front of the sales distribution, we see steadily increasing coefficients from quantiles τ=0.10 
to τ=0.90. Hence, popularity is a more influential buying argument in the hit segment. Moreo-
ver, these results indicate that review volume does not foster a decrease but an increase of dis-
persion of the sales distribution.39 The squared term is significantly negative but of negligible 
impact for all quantiles.  
Our results do support H3 which states that reviews by opinion leaders foster sales. Top review-
ers’ reviews have significantly positive effects throughout the sales distribution. The impact is 
increasing from the lower to the high quantiles, yet in the top quantile the coefficient drops 
slightly.  
Featuring discussion posts does not have any impact on sales in the very tail of the sales distri-
bution, for τ ≥ 30 discussions have positive impact. As for review volume, this finding again 
contrasts H7. Furthermore, the positive impact increases monotonically from 0.056 in the 30th to 
1.420 in the 90th quantile. The results indicate that discussions foster sales concentration among 
the more successful titles. 
                                                     
39 The inference of review volume affecting sales must be tempered, though, by the possibility of endo-
geneity. Recent studies point to the fact that the number of reviews is not totally exogenous given that it is 
not only the driver of consumer purchases but can also be the outcome of sales (e.g. Duan et al., 2005). In 
our research setting, the relevance of this endogeneity hinges on the fact whether current sales ranks are 
affected by historical sales, since we use lagged review variables. Rosenthal (2008) characterizes Ama-
zon’s ranking system as being almost entirely based on the notion “what have you done for me lately” 
discovering that historical sales have negligible impact on decay rates, i.e. the rate a book drops in the 
ranking as a result of a day without a sale. Consequently, the problem of endogeneity – at least in this 
setting here – should be less pronounced. 
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Conversely, reading excerpts have a flattening effect on the sales distribution, at least in the 
long tail. The coefficient is positive and decreasing up to τ < 60. It becomes insignificant in the 
top quantile.  
Product recommendations have positive influence on sales overall, gaining stronger impact 
from the lower to the high quantiles. However, since not much is known about the exact rec-
ommendation policy of Amazon, this result has to be interpreted with caution.  
Turning to the controls, price is significant and of negative sign as expected. Ship time is signif-
icant and of negative sign for τ < 90. Age of the book is negative and significant but of negligi-
ble impact. Format is of negative sign, but insignificant in the mid quantiles. Interestingly, a 
books TV-appearance has negative impact on sales in the mid and the tail of the sales distribu-
tion. In the “short head”, a book’s TV-appearance positively impacts sales. The fact whether a 
book was published by one of the 50 biggest publishing houses has positive impact on sales as 
one might expect. The coefficient increases for the top quantiles which might be attributed to 
differences in marketing budgets. It is natural to assume that potential top sellers receive higher 
budgets than niche books. Being awarded with a literary prize has a positive impact in higher 
quantiles, indicating that it increases sales dispersion among more popular books. 
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7. Discussion 
Exploring the long tail phenomenon and its implications for online retailing, we have analyzed 
whether online reviews, discussion forums, and product recommendations help to reduce search 
costs and actually foster a change in the sales distribution in online book retailing. We have 
collected a data set containing 268,872 observations for 33,609 different books at Amazon.de. 
By adopting an innovative approach we were the first to develop a long tail conversion model 
for the German online market, based on publicly available sales data.  
In order to clarify whether the proliferation of eWOM and recommendation instruments in on-
line commerce in fact can support a paradigm change in retailing – from the steeply distributed 
sales of a Pareto world to a rather flattened sales distribution of a long tail world – the impact of 
these instruments on the unconditional sales distribution was examined. This method allows for 
answering questions as simple as “what are the distributional effects on sales of adding one 
review to each book?” or “what is the impact of increasing the proportion of books with reading 
excerpts?”. 
In sum our results indicate that eWOM actually fosters sales in the long tail, which underlines 
the importance of these instruments as a complement of a long tail strategy. Furthermore, with 
respect to our research questions, we actually see opposing effects of eWOM on the distribution 
of sales. On the one hand, quality information (i.e. reviews and reading excerpts) is highly va-
lued in the long tail. Specifically, positive reviews exert strong impact in the long tail whereas 
negative ones do not suppress sales. This might indicate some kind of selective perception of 
reviews by customers. In the niche, where books are mostly found via more specific queries, 
critical reviews loose their bite whereas positive ones are welcome confirmations of quality. 
Conforming to long tail theory, an increase of the proportion of reviewed books should reduce 
sales inequality in the bottom of the distribution. Yet, the results also indicate that sales inequa-
lity increases in the middle of the sales distribution. 
However, advertising campaigns and related offline promotion in the hit segment (τ = 90) seem 
to create high awareness and furthermore offer customers a large information source, thereby 
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lessening the influence of reviews as buying persuaders. The drop in R2 (0.26) furthermore indi-
cates that unobserved effects, e.g. individual marketing campaigns, gain impact on sales in the 
top quantile.  
On the other hand, popularity indicators such as review volume and discussion posts are highly 
influential buying arguments in the front of the sales distribution. The impacts of these variables 
increase in strength in the high quantiles implying an increase in sales concentration – especial-
ly among super hits. This result might have implications for further understanding the finding of 
Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), who discovered that the number of titles in the top ten per-
cent of weekly VHS and DVD sales dropped by more than 50 percent from years 2000 to 2005. 
In other words: In the hit segment, success is concentrated in ever fewer best-selling titles (El-
berse 2008) and this effect might partially be reinforced by eWOM.  
In the long tail, TV appearance negatively impacts sales. A possible explanation for this fact 
might be a selection bias in the TV shows. There is anecdotal evidence that TV critics systemat-
ically review “arty” books of young and unknown authors which typically target a relatively 
small segment of customers (Clement et al., 2006). Nevertheless, most likely superstars can not 
be totally avoided and those books seem to profit from the promotion effect as the positive coef-
ficients in the top quantiles suggest. However, since the data do not provide for information on 
the valences of the TV reviews other explanations are conceivable. 
A question remains: Will online retailing totally change the economics of cultural markets and 
should retailers switch over from hit strategies to a re-alignment of strategic ends to the long tail 
phenomenon? Subsuming our results, we conclude that it seems likely that bestsellers remain 
important, indicating that a complete paradigm change, i.e. customers turning away from mass 
appeal products towards individually tailored niche products, will not occur in the end. Rather, 
niche products can be an additional but highly profitable revenue source which can be tapped by 
means of eWOM instruments.  
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 IV. BUYING WITHOUT USING: BIASES OF GERMAN 
BAHNCARD BUYERS*40 
1. Abstract 
A large data set of German railway travelers is used to analyze the purchasing decision for fare-
reducing BahnCards. It is expected that this tariff choice is neither completely rational nor irra-
tional, but bounded-rational in a meaningful way. Actually the study predicts a flat-rate bias, i.e. 
an under-use of their BahnCards by many customers. However, this bias should not be too large 
and falling over time. The empirical results approve the hypotheses for the most part, especially 
for the more expensive BahnCard50, whereas the under-use of the cheaper BahnCard25 is so 
extensive that it is not worthwhile on average. 
                                                     
* This chapter originates from joint work with Thomas Ehrmann and Alexander Dilger. 
BUYING WITHOUT USING: BIASES OF GERMAN BAHNCARD BUYERS 110
 
2. Introduction 
“Rules of thumb are among the more efficient pieces of equipment of optimal decision making.” 
Baumol/Quandt 
Many firms offer consumers a menu of contracts. Phone users can choose combinations of 
monthly airtime minutes and prices. Households can opt for different two-part tariffs for elec-
tricity. Also railway passengers are often confronted with contractual choices concerning tariffs. 
They can choose between a high fixed payment ex ante accompanied by a small variable price 
for every mile traveled on the one hand and a “full” price for every mile traveled with no ex 
ante fixed fee on the other hand. The consumer has to find the scheme that minimizes the price 
for every mile traveled. 
Given the German BahnCard scheme there is an optimal contractual choice for every (expected) 
quantity of miles traveled by train. The consumer’s problem is to pick the right contract under 
conditions of imperfect information about his or her own future travel needs. A standard as-
sumption in the economics literature is that consumers have rational expectations about their 
future consumption frequency and choose the utility-maximizing contract. What would be the 
marginal condition for the optimal decision under imperfect information? It is to equate the 
marginal costs of additional information gathering with its (expected) marginal benefits and 
then to decide accordingly. Unfortunately, this condition, that is easily formulated, is very ab-
stract and of little help to estimate accurately the future individual travel demand. This chapter’s 
study will check how rational the expectations are that consumers have of their future (rail) 
travel frequency and whether they choose their utility-maximizing contract accordingly. Moreo-
ver, it is analyzed whether their decisions have been right ex post and, if not, whether they ad-
just their behavior or not. 
By now, scholars gained more insight into critical determinants of demand. Specifically, factors 
such as sunk costs are known to influence consumption as laid out by Arkes and Blumer (1985) 
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and McAfee, Mialon and Mialon (2010).41 Moreover, from a behavioral economics perspective, 
prior payment mechanisms, bundling, and timing of payment or purchasing have been analyzed 
with respect to their effects on demand (Gourville and Soman, 1998; Soman, 2001; Soman and 
Gourville, 2001; Thaler, 1980; Thaler, 1985; Wertenbroch, 1998). For instance, studying public 
transport service acceptance, FitzRoy and Smith (1999) find positive impact of fixed fee season 
tickets on aggregate demand.42 However, still not much is known about what affects the choice 
of a tariff besides expected consumption. Here we try to find out more about the effects of flat-
rate pricing (Miravete, 2003). DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004; 2006) famously explain flat-
rate biases, i.e. an under-use of contracts by many customers, with overconfidence about time 
inconsistency, using the example of memberships in fitness clubs.  
Consumers may overestimate their demand for a good, e.g. due to producer advertising as ar-
gued by Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991). Drawing on empirical evidence, Nunes (2000) explains 
how users integrate usage expectation into the decision process when choosing between paying 
a flat fee for unlimited access and paying per use. Consumers tend to compare the subjective 
likelihood of using more than the break-even volume with the subjective likelihood of using 
less. He finds that consumers habitually overestimate the likelihood of using enough to justify 
the flat-rate and thus falsely favor this payment plan. The perceived range of usage thereby 
strongly affects the consumers’ misperceptions. 
Older studies of tariff-choice biases examined the usage of telephone services (Kling and van 
der Ploeg, 1990; Kridel, Lehman and Weisman, 1993; Train, Ben-Akiva and Atherton, 1989; 
Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva, 1987). Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) distinguish four different 
causes for flat-rate biases: the “insurance effect” (Train, 1991; Miravete, 2002; Winer, 2005), 
the “taxi meter effect” (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998; Thaler, 1999), the “convenience effect” 
                                                     
41 Arkes and Blumer (1985) put forth that reputational concerns can justify the consideration of sunk costs 
in consumption decisions (on a more recent examination of social interactions see e.g. Cohen-Cole and 
Zanella, 2009). 
42 Public transport acceptance and pricing has widely been analyzed in the context of rising external costs 
of private transport due to traffic congestion (FitzRoy and Smith, 1999; see also Steimez (2009) on con-
gestion related externalities). In a related context, Van Vuuren and Rietveld (2002) estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for train kilometers considering a two-part tariff option. For a general theoretical 
justification of differentiated price structures in the transport sector see e.g. Carbajo (1998).  
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(Winer, 2005; Kling and van der Ploeg, 1990), and the “overestimation effect” (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier, 2006). This study takes a more general look at the decision between different 
choices of fixed and variable fees. We expect to find a flat-rate bias, whatever its reason, but 
also some bounded rationality and learning, meaning better decisions over time.   
This study is the first that analyzes a large data set of German railway travelers. This application 
differs from the so far analyzed telephone and internet services or gyms in at least two respects. 
First, demand seems to be more of an exogenous nature than e.g. the visits paid to a gym or the 
usage of internet services. Second, the monetary outlays, cancellation costs etc. are significantly 
higher than the respective costs of internet services. While the analysis concentrates on the cost 
side, some of the results also shed some light on the perceived future benefits of the BahnCard 
scheme. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3 the simple economics of con-
tractual choice are developed – both at the purchase date of the BahnCard and at possible re-
newal dates – and hypotheses are formulated. In section 4 the main features of the BahnCard 
data set are introduced. Then in section 5 the hypotheses are tested empirically. Section 6 dis-
cusses possible explanations for the empirical results and concludes. 
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3. Simple Standard Economics and Hypotheses 
We set up a simple framework of contract choice and BahnCard usage. We begin with an analy-
sis of the optimal customer’s choice under complete information or ex post, given the train 
journeys he or she actually made.43 Certainly, ex ante the customer does not have complete in-
formation and (not) buying a BahnCard is a risky decision. Therefore, the first derived Hypo-
thesis 0 concerning the optimal decision under complete information is only a reference case 
and we do not expect this hypothesis to be true. Otherwise the analysis could stop there. 
A contract (Li, αp) gives customers the right to use a train for a fee αp, once the flat fee Li is 
paid. Li stands for different fixed fees that induce different variable fee rebates α on p. The two 
extreme cases are the flat-rate (L, 0), the so-called BahnCard100 (BC100) and the pay-per-mile-
tariff (0, p). The most common BahnCards have either rebates α of 25% or 50% on p. Consum-
ers can choose between all these contracts.  
The discount effect of the BahnCard25 (BC25) contract with a rebate α of 25% on p begins at a 
minimum sum of four times the flat fee in ticket purchases. In other words, the BC25 is not 
worth buying for non-frequent travelers who spent less than this amount a year on rail travel. 
Let v be the total amount spend on rail travel a year (based on the standard fare), then the lower 
optimality boundary of the BC25 contract is given by 
(1) v ≥ L25 + 0.75v, 
and thus, 
(2) v25l = L25/0.25. 
                                                     
43 Both are not the same since buying a BahnCard changes the marginal prices. Thus complete informa-
tion implies optimal decisions concerning buying a BahnCard and train tickets later, whereas the reverse 
is not necessarily true. One can make extra journeys with a BahnCard at hand, even if one would not have 
bought the card to make these journeys. However, this possible bias in this analysis does not seem to be 
very important empirically, because most BahnCard holders do use their cards less than optimal although 
the marginal prices are lower (see below). 
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Hence, assuming a flat fee L25 of EUR 57,44 a yearly spending of EUR 228 marks the break even 
travel volume v25l for the BC25.  
More frequent travelers might profit from a higher contract such as the BahnCard50 (BC50) 
which grants a rebate α of 50% on p. One might assume that a BC50 is worth buying if v ex-
ceeds twice the flat fee L50 since then total travel spending is minimized relative to the pay-per-
mile tariff. However, in defining the lower optimality boundary of the BC50 contract the BC25 
contract is the relevant benchmark. Consequently, the lower optimality boundary of the BC50 
contract is given by 
(3) L25 + 0.75v ≥ L50 + 0.5v, 
and thus, 
(4) v50l = (L50 - L25)/0.25. 
Assuming a flat fee L50 of EUR 225, a yearly spending of EUR 672 marks the break even travel 
volume v50l of the BC50 contract.  
As can easily be seen from equation (5) and (6), only very frequent travelers profit from a 
BC100 contract. The lower optimality boundary is given by  
(5) L50 + 0.5v ≥ L100, 
and thus, 
(6) v100l = (L100 - L50)/0.5. 
At a price of EUR 3,650, this card is only worth buying if v exceeds EUR 6,850.45  
To subsume: Based on current prices, for every v smaller than EUR 228 the pay-per-mile tariff 
is optimal, for v between EUR 228 and EUR 672 the BC25 contract is optimal, and for v in the 
                                                     
44 This is the current (2009) value. In the past the BC25 as well as the other BahnCards were cheaper but 
the formulas remain the same. 
45 The optimality intervals of equations (1) to (6) apply for all L50 ≥ 2·L25 and L100 ≥ 2·L50. 
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interval of EUR 672 and EUR 6,850 the BC50 is optimal. For every v beyond EUR 6,850 the 
BC100 minimizes travel costs. 
Hypothesis 0 (Optimal Buying Decision for a Particular BahnCard): Agents choose the optimal 
BahnCard contract for the mileage they travel by train.  
It shall be stressed again that this study does not expect that all or most customers decide opti-
mally ex post. Hypothesis 0 is the reference case and we expect empirical evidence contrary to 
it. Nevertheless, the lack of complete information and the existence of bounded rationality do 
not mean the complete lack of all information and total irrationality. On the contrary, we expect 
some (bounded) rationality even in the mistakes and biases human beings are prone to.  
That is why we expect that BahnCards and travel demand are systematically connected. Who 
anticipates more miles m by train will buy with a higher probability a more expensive BahnCard 
than someone expecting to travel less miles. Moreover, whereas the individual expectations can 
be wrong, in the aggregate they are fulfilled more or less. There is a second reason why the 
owners of more expensive BahnCards will use them more than those of cheaper ones: The mar-
ginal price of an additional mile is lower. Unfortunately, we cannot differentiate empirically 
between these two explanations but both support the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1 (Higher Travel Demand by Users of More Expensive BahnCards): The different 
contracts (Li , αp) require different degrees of ex ante commitment of consumers and change 
marginal prices such that the buyers of more expensive BahnCards accordingly travel more.  
(7) m100 > m50 > m25 > m0. 
Whereas Hypothesis 1 implies at least a weak form of rationality, we expect some deviations 
from strict rationality, first and foremost a flat-rate bias. A flat-rate bias means that many travel-
ers prefer a (more or less) flat rate even though their billing rate would be lower on a pay-per-
mile price.46 The magnitude F of a flat-rate bias can be measured by the additional price of the 
                                                     
46 According to Nunes (2000) a flat-rate bias exists on the individual level when an actor pays a fixed fee 
for unlimited access that costs more than a usage-dependent tariff would have cost, given his demonstrat-
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chosen BahnCard and bought tickets compared to the optimal BahnCard and corresponding 
ticket prices. For example, buying once a BC100 ends any worries about the costs of all train 
trips in the following 12 months. This ease of mind has some value such that paying more than 
the savings per miles traveled can be boundedly rational.47 In the case of the BC100 it is also 
possible to save real transaction and opportunity costs because its owner does not need to buy 
any more tickets. BC50 and BC25 do not bring about this real convenience but also lower wor-
ries and emotional costs for many train tickets.   
Hypothesis 2 (Existence of a Flat-Rate Bias): There exists a flat-rate bias among BahnCard 
holders, i.e. there are many BahnCards which are more expensive than optimal (considering 
only the BahnCard and ticket fees). 
Moreover, we expect that the flat-rate bias is not independent of the kind of BahnCard. Instead 
F should be higher for more expensive BahnCards. First, it is possible to make greater mistakes 
with a more expensive card. In the extreme, a BahnCard is not used at all such that the flat-rate 
bias equals the price of the card. Second, there is a further possibility of mistake when buying a 
BC50 compared to a BC25. As shown above, it is possible that a BC50 is better than no Bahn-
Card at all but worse than buying a BC25. The same holds for even a larger range of miles when 
a BC100 is compared to a BC50.  
Hypothesis 3 (Higher Flat-Rate Bias of More Expensive BahnCards): The flat-rate bias is in-
creasing in the price of the BahnCard. 
(8) F100 > F50 > F25. 
                                                                                                                                                           
ed demand. Here we follow Nunes (2000) and extend this definition to our context. Hence, a flat-rate bias 
exists when an actor chooses a contract involving a high fixed fee and low variable costs although another 
contract with a lower fixed fee and higher variable costs would have resulted in a lower billing rate, given 
his demonstrated demand. In measuring the existence of a flat-rate bias, we basically follow the common 
method of measuring the proportion of users in a tariff that would have paid less in a lower tariff, given 
ex post usage data (see e.g. Mitchell and Vogelsang 1991; Kridel, Lehman and Weisman, 1993; Nunes, 
2000; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006). 
47 Perfect rationality includes the ability to calculate everything and to make decisions without costs, emo-
tional or otherwise (besides the real costs one is deciding about, of course). 
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Whereas we expect a flat-rate bias and under-using of many BahnCards, we do not think that 
the mistakes of BahnCard users are arbitrarily high. On the contrary, the average user probably 
profits not only from having a BahnCard (compared to having none) but also from having the 
specific BahnCard he or she has (compared to none or any other). This also means that those 
customers, who have the right BahnCard profit more by it than the others, having the wrong 
one, lose. From this it follows that the average utility from a BahnCard is positive.  
Hypothesis 4 (BahnCards are Useful on Average): The average utility for BahnCard users is 
higher with their specific BahnCard than without it. 
What can be said about the different customers’ expectations about their own future travel de-
mand? Customers who expect a low travel demand in the future prefer a cheaper BahnCard or 
none at all. Therefore the option to switch sooner to a lower BahnCard or to payment per mile 
should be valued highly by them. Customers who view themselves as heavy users in the future 
should prefer the high BahnCard contract types. These customers should value the reduced price 
of each mile traveled and should not mind the yearly commitment. A kind of sorting therefore 
implies that the higher the chosen contract in the past the more likely these customers should 
renew a high contract. The renewal probability R of a high contract should be higher than for the 
low contract.  
Hypothesis 5 (Higher Renewal Probabilities for More Expensive BahnCards): The renewal 
probability of a more expensive BahnCard is higher than for a cheaper one. 
(9) R100 > R50 > R25. 
There are other questions about what is happening at the end of the contractual period, after 
every customer knows at least for the past about his or her travel demand. Each consumer can 
then either renew the BahnCard with the same or a different contract, or opt out (i.e. switch to 
the pay-per-mile contract). Let si denote the annual savings from switching from contract i to 
another contract. Then the customer should switch if the value of savings is positive, i.e. 
(10) si > 0. 
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Should the customer incur switching costs k than he or she has to compare realized k with the 
benefits, implying the switching becomes more costly. Now over time even bounded-rational 
holders of BahnCards should learn something about their usage and should learn to make more 
and more informed guesses about si and therefore about their optimal contract. Learning will 
lead customers with ex post low usage to opt for (0, p). When we define individuals that hold on 
to their initial BahnCard contract as “constant customers” than we should find in the cohort of a 
particular BahnCard higher usage in subsequent years than was the usage of the initial group, 
because many of the less frequent travelers switch to pay per mile over the years. Among 
BahnCard users that have initially opted for an expensive contract, the expected usage in subse-
quent years among “constant customers” is higher than the usage in the first year for the initial 
group. 
Hypothesis 6 (Better Usage of BahnCards Over Time): In the aggregate the use of the Bahn-
Cards gets better over time (time measured in calendar years or the years of using a particular 
type of BahnCard). 
Given that someone holds his or her BahnCard for two or more periods, we expect fewer mis-
takes in using it in the long run than within single periods. The estimation of one’s travel de-
mand can be too high or too low but in the long run such mistakes cancel each other out. More-
over, bounded-rational people are able to learn from their mistakes such that their use of a 
BahnCard gets better over time. 
Hypothesis 7 (Better Use Over Longer Periods): For individuals who hold their BahnCards, the 
use is better over longer periods of time than in single periods. 
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4. BahnCard Dataset 
4.1 Data and Sample Period 
Our data to test the hypotheses were provided by the German railway company Deutsche Bahn 
(DB) AG and comprise detailed information on customers’ individual demographic characteris-
tics, BahnCard contract choices and individual transaction data, i.e. ticket purchase behavior. 
The representative sample was drawn from the population of members of the company’s cus-
tomer loyalty programs “bahn.bonus” and “bahn.comfort”. The bahn.bonus program awards 
points to customers based on the amount they purchase. These points can be collected and final-
ly spend on different rewards, e.g. train tickets, 1st class upgrades or car rentals. bahn.comfort is 
a customer program which awards premium status for customers who spend a predetermined 
amount of money on ticket purchases. Within both programs every euro in purchases translates 
in one point.48 Since customers are rewarded with points for ticket purchases the data set allows 
for the reproduction of individual traveling behavior. Based on this information we evaluate the 
efficiency of BahnCard contracts. The sample period is December 2002 through July 2008. 
4.2 Contractual Menu 
The data include contracts with different standard reductions on tickets. Specifically, customers 
can choose between the following contracts: BC25, BC50 and BC100. Each contract is availa-
ble for the 1st and 2nd class. Currently, the standard BC25 contract involves an up-front fee of 
EUR 57 (2nd class) and a reduction of 25 percent on domestic tickets for 12 months from the 
date of issue.49 The BC50 is offered at a price of EUR 225 (2nd class) and grants reductions of 
50 percent on fares. The BC100 costs EUR 3,650 (2nd class) and allows free travel on all DB-
trains for one year. 
In addition to the standard contracts, the DB AG offers several reduced fee contracts with initial 
fees ranging from EUR 0 (BC25 2nd class for family members of BC100 customers) to EUR 
                                                     
48 Within the bahn.bonus program purchases of 1st class tickets are awarded with 1.5 points. 
49 This accounts at least for all DB-trains. Parts of the regional passenger rail are operated by other rail 
companies than the DB AG. Several of these companies grant reductions on fares for BahnCard custom-
ers, too.  
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115 (BC50 2nd class for students and senior citizens or e.g. family members of BC50 custom-
ers). If not cancelled, BC25 and BC50 contracts are automatically renewed after 12 months. 
Cancellation can be done in written form until six weeks before the end of validity. BC100 con-
tracts end after one year.50 BC25 and BC50 customers can switch to higher contracts within the 
contract period. The residual value of the current card is then refunded. Customers cannot 
switch to lower contracts during the duration of an ongoing contract. 
4.3 Sample Construction and Key Variables 
In sum, we received data on more than four million transactions, each being related to one of 
approximately 800,000 BahnCards. These data constitute the travel history of over 300,000 
customers. However, to construct a reliable data base for our analysis we had to make some 
severe adjustments. Since not all members of the loyalty programs frequently collect bonus 
points we excluded all customers whose overall lifetime sales volume equals zero. Furthermore, 
we dropped all customers with non-standard and promotional contracts such as cards with less 
than 12 months duration, for example. Finally, we concentrated on customers with 2nd class 
BahnCards, in order to avoid assignment problems and to achieve a maximum comparability 
between contracts. Consequently, our final dataset features 259,752 BahnCards of 83,263 cus-
tomers with corresponding transaction data.51  
With regards to single transactions, i.e. ticket purchases, key variables of the dataset include the 
purchase date, ticket price, reduction rate, class, origin and destination station, number of pas-
sengers, a round trip indicator, and a general description indicating whether the travel’s origin or 
destination station is not domestic, for example. Since the ticket price represents the reduced 
price we calculated the standard fare based on the actual reduction rate for each ticket in order 
to have a common basis of comparison. Inbound and outbound tickets, i.e. travels from or to 
another country, constitute a special case here. The DB AG offers a “Railplus” option for Bahn-
                                                     
50 The BC100 can also be subscribed at a monthly fee of EUR 335 with minimum contract duration of 12 
months.  
51 Despite our adjustments there still might be some unobserved aspects within the data. First, the data 
originates from a decentralized large scale system which generally aggravates consistent data input. 
Second, a potential limitation is that customers might exhibit inconsistencies with respect to bonus point 
collection behavior. 
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card customers, which grants a 25% reduction on standard fares for the abroad section when 
traveling to 29 European countries.52 Obviously, for the calculation of standard fares of BC50 
customers this poses issues. In particular, the ticket price reflects a 50% reduction on the stan-
dard fare of the domestic section of the travel and a 25% reduction on the standard fare of the 
abroad section. Since we do not have any information on the ratio of domestic to non-domestic 
route length for these tickets, we assumed that customers realized a reduction of at least 25% on 
the entire route.53 
For our analysis we aggregated all transactional data on a contract basis. Consequently, our final 
sample features the following information for each BahnCard contract: Customer ID, reduction 
rate, flat fee, date of issue, end of validity, a dummy indicating whether the contract is subject to 
automatic renewal, a Railplus dummy, total spending on tickets (including reduction), and vir-
tual total spending on tickets without a BahnCard (hypothetical standard fare).54  
Our first research question is, whether the chosen contracts are optimal from the customers’ 
perspectives considering individual traveling behavior. Hence, we calculated the sums of total 
spending for all possibly available contracts as benchmarks for the actual sum of spending and 
assigned dummy variables indicating whether the chosen contract was efficient, i.e. cost mini-
mizing, or not.55 First, one dummy indicates whether a lower contract implies lower costs, i.e. if 
a customer did not reach the break even travel volume. Second, one dummy indicates whether 
or not a higher contract implies lower costs, i.e. if a customer reached the break even travel vo-
lume of a higher contract. Third, a set of variables constitute the difference in costs between the 
actual contract and the alternative options. These variables serve as bases for utility calculation. 
                                                     
52 Since December 2007 Railplus is included in standard BahnCard contracts. Before that, Railplus was 
optional and subject to a fee of EUR 15. 
53 This assumption tends to underestimate reductions of BC50 customers. However, the alternative option 
would have been to exclude all in- and outbound tickets, which, we feel, would have been an even strong-
er underestimation of Bahncard reductions. Anyway, the proportion and costs of such trips abroad are 
quite small (see below).  
54 Obviously, BC100 users do not need to purchase tickets and consequently our database lacks informa-
tion on travel behavior of those customers. From this follows that we cannot draw conclusions on the 
individual efficiency of BC100 contracts. Nevertheless, these contracts function as a reference point with-
in the data and represent an important alternative option for BC25 and BC50 customers at the end of a 
contract period. 
55 Several contracts are ongoing at the end of the sample period. In these cases, we included the flat fee on 
a pro rata basis.  
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Apart from the evaluation of single contract selection, we are especially interested in the indi-
vidual contract history of customers. Hence, each dataset contains information on the successive 
contracts which allows for observing if customers switch inefficient contracts or opt out at the 
end of a contract period in order to increase utility.  
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Within our sample, 45.9 percent of all contracts with transactional data are BC25 contracts and 
54.1 percent BC50. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Contracts BC25 BC50 
number of contracts 
     total 119,240 140,512 
     completed 101,597 114,560 
initial fee 
 
48.04  
(14.86) 
140.72  
(50.17) 
total spending on tickets 
     incl. reduction 
 
102.36  
(206.53) 
236.28  
(402.33) 
     hypothetical standard fare 
 
136.48  
(275.38) 
467.78  
(797.49) 
total spending on abroad tickets 
 
4.62  
(37.53) 
7.17  
(58.46) 
total costs 
 
145.39  
(210.03) 
363.77  
(419.49) 
number of tickets 
 
2.18  
(5.08) 
7.25  
(12.94) 
n   119,240 140,512 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. A completed contract ends 
before the date of data retrieval. 
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics Contracts 
On average, BC25 customers paid EUR 48.04 as initial fee, BC50 customers paid EUR 140.72. 
A typical BC25 customer spends EUR 102.36 on tickets, BC50 users spend EUR 236.28. The 
average spending on in- and outbound tickets is considerably small with EUR 4.62 (BC25) and 
EUR 7.17 (BC50). Each contract accounts for 2.18 (BC25) and 7.25 (BC50) tickets and gene-
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rates total costs for the average costumer of EUR 145.39 (BC25) and EUR 363.77 (BC50), re-
spectively.  
Customers 
age at first contract 
 
38.66  
(17.59) 
female 
 
0.54  
(0.50) 
total spending on tickets 
 
544.70  
(1057.92) 
number of contracts 
 
3.12  
(1.69) 
N   83,263 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Total 
spending on tickets includes reduction. 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics Customers 
With respect to customers, Table 9 reveals that the typical BahnCard customer is approximately 
39 years old at first sign-up. About 54% of customers are female and individuals buy on average 
3.12 BahnCards during the sample period. The average total spending on tickets for all contracts 
is EUR 544.70. 
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5. Empirical Results 
We used the data described in section 4 to test the hypotheses derived in section 3 and got the 
following results. 
Hypothesis 0 (Optimal Buying Decision for a Particular BahnCard): 
If BahnCards were used perfectly – i.e., from an ex post perspective, users choose the right con-
tract for the mileage they travel by train – we should not observe sub-optimal contracts. Howev-
er, our first empirical result shows that the observed distribution of optimal contracts deviates 
significantly from the assumption of perfect usage.56 A chi-square goodness-of-fit test confirms 
that the null hypothesis, i.e., the frequency distribution of optimal contracts in our sample is 
consistent with the theoretical distribution (100%), can be rejected at a significance level of 
p<.001.57 In particular, we assigned a dummy variable indicating whether a certain contract is 
cost minimizing (optimal=1) or not (optimal=0), depending on individual travel behavior. That 
is, another contract, either a higher, a lower, or the pay-per-mile contract would have resulted in 
lower total costs. In fact, only 29.7% of contracts were within the respective optimality bounda-
ries as derived in section 3. Hence, 70.3% of contracts were not optimal. As stressed above, we 
actually did not expect that all users decide optimally ex post, and consequently, Hypothesis 0 is 
not supported by our data. 
Hypothesis 1 (Higher Travel Demand by Users of More Expensive BahnCards): 
As noted in section 4, the data unfortunately do not provide information on travel behavior of 
BC100 and pay-per-mile tariff users. Nevertheless, according to equation (7), buyers of a BC50 
should travel more than BC25 customers, reflecting higher degrees of ex ante commitment as 
                                                     
56 The methods applied in this chapter arise from the specific hypothesis formulations as well as from the 
scale of the criterions under consideration. Specifically, when comparing rates and proportions of the 
occurrence of a particular attribute or a combination of attributes, we resort to the class of chi-square 
methods, representing the most frequently applied statistical tests for categorical data (e.g. Fleiss et al., 
2003). However, considering interval-scaled data we apply both parametric and non-parametric methods 
in order to enhance the robustness of our results. 
57 A chi-square “goodness-of-fit-test” tests whether the frequency distribution of certain events observed 
in a sample is consistent with a particular theoretical distribution. Thereby, the events have to be mutually 
exclusive with a total probability of 1. Since the approximation to the chi-square distribution breaks down 
if expected frequencies are too low (<5, see Siegel and Castellan, 1988; or Gibbons and Chakraborti, 
2003), we slightly relaxed the strong assumption of no sub-optimal contracts to the lower boundary.  
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well as lower marginal prices. Table 10 illustrates the results of an independent-samples t-test.58 
The test variable is total annual spending on tickets (based on the standard fare), with BC50 and 
BC25 contracts representing the two samples. BC25 customers spend on average the amount of 
EUR 144.30 on tickets, this being significantly less than the average spending of BC50 users 
(EUR 484.51). Consequently, we find strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1 N Mean s.e. p* 
annual ticket spending BC25 101,597 144.30 .898 
annual ticket spending BC50 114,560 484.51 2.449 
difference -340.21 2.608 <.001  
* p values from independent samples t-test. 
Table 10. Empirical Results – Usage by Contracts 
Hypothesis 2 (Existence of a Flat-Rate Bias): 
While customers obviously exhibit weak forms of rationality, the reference case indicates devia-
tions from strict rationality in that users seem to be prone to under-using of BahnCards, i.e. total 
monetary costs are not minimized. Specifically, as it might be boundedly rational to prefer a 
BahnCard with lower marginal costs over the pay-per-mile price we should observe a flat-rate 
bias. Table 11 shows the results of a non-parametric sign test, which is commonly used when 
only the direction of differences is of interest, not the magnitude (Conover 1999). We con-
structed two variables current BahnCard and optimal BahnCard and assigned values (0, 25, 50, 
and 100) according to the reduction rates of the actual contract and the contract which would 
have minimized total (monetary) costs, depending on individual travel behavior. The sign test 
poses the null hypothesis optimal BahnCard = current BahnCard and tests whether positive and 
negative differences between a random pair of measurements are equally likely to occur. With 
respect to Hypothesis 2 we should observe a higher probability for the case optimal BahnCard < 
current BahnCard. 
                                                     
58 Since we only included completed contracts, n scales down to the total of 216,157 observations. The 
underlying assumptions of the t-test are homogeneity of variances in the two samples and the criterion 
under consideration has to be interval-scaled. Beyond that, the t-test requires normal distribution of the 
sample-mean, which is given for moderately large sample sizes (n>30) according to the central limit theo-
rem (Greene, 2008; Lumley et al., 2002). However, we corrected for heterogeneous variances, and we 
furthermore conducted a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U-Test in order to test the robustness of our 
results (e.g. Daniel, 2000). The results did not change. 
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Hypothesis 2 n 
optimal BahnCard < current BahnCard 173,969 
optimal BahnCard > current BahnCard 8,643 
optimal BahnCard = current BahnCard 77,140 
n 259,752 
z -386.88 
p <.001 
Table 11. Empirical Results – Sign Test 
In 67% of cases customers under-used their BahnCard, i.e., switching to a lower contract or to 
the pay-per-mile tariff would lower total monetary costs. In only 3.3% of cases BahnCards were 
over-used, i.e. switching to a higher contract would minimize costs. As noted above, 29.7% of 
contracts are optimal. The null hypothesis can be rejected at a significance level of p<.001. 
Thus, our data corroborate the existence of a flat-rate bias and consequently Hypothesis 2.59 
Hypothesis 3 (Higher Flat-Rate Bias of More Expensive BahnCards): 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, which states that the flat-rate bias is higher for more expensive 
BahnCards, we analyzed whether the magnitude of the bias F differs significantly between 
BahnCard types. Therefore we conducted an independent-samples t-test with the test variable 
being defined as the difference in costs between the optimal contract plus corresponding tickets 
purchases and the chosen BahnCard and bought tickets. As we only consider under-used con-
tracts n scales down to 173,969 with BC25 (88,828) and BC50 (85,141) contracts representing 
the two samples. As can easily be seen from Table 12, our results support Hypothesis 3 
(p<.001). On average, BC25 users with under-used contracts incurred losses of EUR 35.45. 
BC50 users incurred losses of EUR 96.68 as a result of choosing sub-optimal contracts (from a 
strictly monetary perspective).60 This appears reasonable since the higher flat-fee allows for 
more severe mistakes from an individual perspective.  
                                                     
59 Furthermore, we conducted another chi-square goodness-of-fit test which confirms that the null hypo-
thesis, i.e., the frequency distribution of sub-optimal contracts in our sample is consistent with the theoret-
ical distribution (0%), can be rejected at a significance level of p<.001. The test variable was a dummy 
indicating whether a contract was under-used (under-use=1) or not (under-use=0). 
60 A further Mann-Whitney-U-Test was highly significant, too.  
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Hypothesis 3 N Mean s.e. p* 
utility BC25 under-use 88,828 -35.45 .064 
utility BC50 under-use 85,141 -96.68 .192 
difference 61.23 .202 <.001 
* p values from independent samples t-test. 
Table 12. Empirical Results – Flat-Rate Bias by Contracts 
Hypothesis 4 (BahnCards are Useful on Average): 
Although we observe a flat-rate bias, we expect the average user to profit not only from having 
a BahnCard at all but also from having his or her specific BahnCard. If so, users with the right 
BahnCard should profit more by it than others lose, as predicted by Hypothesis 4.  
For a start, we analyze whether customers profit from having a BahnCard at all, i.e., as com-
pared to having none. We conducted an independent-samples t-test with users who under-used 
their BahnCards (under-use=1) and those who did not (under-use=0) representing the two sam-
ples. The test variable is defined as the absolute value of the difference in costs of the chosen 
BahnCard plus ticket prices and the costs of the ticket purchases based on the standard fare.61 
Considering both BC25 and BC50 contracts, the empirical results in Table 13 support Hypothe-
sis 4. On average, customers who under-use their BahnCard incur losses of EUR 65.69, whereas 
customers with the right contract benefit from it to the amount of EUR 272.15 (p<.001).62 In the 
aggregate, the mean of losses and profits is positive, i.e., the average utility from a BahnCard 
amounts to EUR 52.17. However, splitting the sample into sub-samples according to contract 
type, we obtain the following results: within the BC25 sample losses due to under-usage on 
average amount to EUR 35.45, profits to EUR 68.61. Although losses and profits differ signifi-
cantly (p<.001), Hypothesis 4 is only partly corroborated with respect to this sub-sample since 
its aggregate mean is negative with EUR -8.91. Within the BC50 sample losses are on average 
EUR 99.15, profits amount to EUR 374.95 (p<.001). Here the aggregate mean is positive again 
with EUR 104.01.  
                                                     
61 Note that within these tests we do not evaluate over-usage as faulty behavior.  
62 A Mann-Whitney-U-Test yielded the same result. 
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Hypothesis 4 N Mean s.e. p* 
Point of Comparison: Standard Fare   
utility (absolute value) under-use 169,128 65.69 .126 
utility (absolute value) optimal use 90,624 272.15 1.358 
difference -206.45 1.363 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC25 under-use 88,828 35.45 .064 
utility (absolute value) BC25 optimal use 30,412 68.61 .554 
difference -33.16 .557 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC50 under-use 80,300 99.15 .198 
utility (absolute value) BC50 optimal use  60,212 374.95 1.889 
difference  -275.80 1.899 <.001 
Point of Comparison: Lower Boundary   
utility (absolute value) under-use 173,969 49.29 .090 
utility (absolute value) optimal use 85,783 142.58 .681 
difference -93.29 .687 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC25 under-use 88,828 35.45 .064 
utility (absolute value) BC25 optimal use 30,412 68.61 .554 
difference -33.16 .557 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC50 under-use 85,141 63.73 .158 
utility (absolute value) BC50 optimal use  55,371 183.21 .968 
difference  -119.48 .981 <.001 
Point of Comparison: Optimal Contract   
utility (absolute value) under-use 173,969 65.41 .124 
utility (absolute value) optimal use 85,783 142.58 .681 
difference -77.17 .692 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC25 under-use 88,828 35.45 .064 
utility (absolute value) BC25 optimal use 30,412 68.61 .554 
difference -33.16 .557 <.001 
utility (absolute value) BC50 under-use 85,141 96.68 .192 
utility (absolute value) BC50 optimal use  55,371 183.21 .968 
difference  -86.53 .987 <.001 
* p values from independent samples t-test. 
Table 13. Empirical Results – Average Utility 
Now we analyze whether the average customer profits from having his or her specific Bahn-
Card. Defining the relevant point of comparison is crucial for quantifying the (dis-)utility de-
rived from a certain contract. This is all the more true as customers differ in terms of utility 
assessment, either due to differences in search costs or the level of rationality for example. 
Hence, from the diversity of individual perceptions follows a variety of potential benchmarks 
for measuring utility. In the following we account for this fact by, firstly, comparing the actual 
contract to the next lower contract, and, secondly, by comparing the actual contract to the ex 
post optimal regime. 
BUYING WITHOUT USING: BIASES OF GERMAN BAHNCARD BUYERS 129
 
Within this test, the test variable is defined as the absolute value of the difference in costs of the 
chosen BahnCard and ticket purchases and the price of the next lower contract and correspond-
ing tickets. Considering both BC25 and BC50 contracts, the empirical results in Table 13 sup-
port Hypothesis 4. Users with the wrong BahnCard on average incur losses of EUR 49.29, whe-
reas customers with the right contract benefit from it to the amount of EUR 142.58 (p<.001).63 
In the aggregate, the average utility from a BahnCard is positive and amounts to EUR 14.08. 
Further differentiating between contracts, we obtain the following results: within the sample of 
the BC25 users, results do not change as compared to the first test.64 Those with the wrong con-
tract lose EUR 35.45, this being significantly less than the positive utility of optimal users 
which is EUR 68.61 (p<.001). The aggregate mean is negative with EUR -8.91. Within the 
BC50 sample, the aggregate mean is positive again (EUR 33.58) and the positive utility of trav-
elers with the right contract (EUR 183.21) exceeds the negative of those with the wrong contract 
(EUR 63.73) significantly (p<.001). 
Next, we calculate the utility of the actual contract based on the comparison to the ex post op-
timal regime. In particular, for under-using BC50 customers either the BC25 or no BahnCard is 
the cost minimizing option. Consequently, the test variable is defined as absolute value of the 
difference in costs of the chosen BahnCard and ticket purchases and the price of the ex post 
optimal contract and corresponding tickets.65 As Table 13 shows, the results basically remain 
stable. Specifically, losses due to under-usage rise to an average of EUR 65.41, this being sig-
nificantly less than profits which remain constant as compared to the foregoing test with EUR 
142.58 (p<.001). In the aggregate users still profit from their specific BahnCard as the average 
utility is positive with EUR 3.27. This decrease in average utility is driven by the rising average 
losses due to under-usage of the BC50 sub-sample, since the results of the BC25 contracts do 
not change. In particular, losses are on average EUR 96.68 as opposed to profits of EUR 183.21 
                                                     
63 A Mann-Whitney-U-Test yielded the same result. 
64 Note that for a BC25 contract the next lower boundary is the no BahnCard option, i.e. the standard fare. 
65 For optimally used contracts, utility is calculated based on the comparison to the next worst contract, 
i.e. the lower boundary. 
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(p<.001). As a consequence the average utility of the BC50 sample is positive and amounts to 
EUR 13.62. 
To summarize, Hypothesis 4 is mainly corroborated by our data, i.e., the average user not only 
profits from having a BahnCard at all but also from having his or her specific BahnCard. This 
applies with the exception that the average utility of the BC25 sub-sample is negative. 
Hypothesis 5 (Higher Renewal Probabilities for More Expensive BahnCards): 
To test whether more expensive contracts imply higher renewal probabilities, as stated by Hy-
pothesis 5, we carried out a chi-square test of independence. We assigned a dummy variable 
indicating whether a customer holds on to his or her initial contract (renewal=1) or not, i.e., 
whether the user opts out or switches the contract (renewal=0). Contract type (25, 50) was the 
second variable under consideration in our contingency table. Hypothesis 5 is substantiated by 
the data. The renewal probability increases for more expensive BahnCards. In particular, BC50 
customers are 1.1 times as likely to renew contracts as BC25 customers (p<.001, see Table 14). 
Hypothesis 5  renewal no yes total 
contract BC25 n 11,498 28,004 39,502 
  % of contract 29.1 70.9 100 
      
 BC50 n 8,351 30,026 38,377 
  % of contract 21.8 78.2 100 
      
total  n 19,849 58,030 77,879 
  % of contract 25.5 74.5 100 
χ2   553.27   
df   1   
p   <.001   
φ   .084   
Table 14. Empirical Results – Contract Renewal Probability 
Hypothesis 6 (Better Usage of BahnCards Over Time): 
In order to analyze usage of BahnCards over time and to assess the influence of learning we 
carried out different tests. From a general perspective BahnCard usage should increase in calen-
dar years if learning occurs, as stated in Hypothesis 6. In particular, we compare the share of 
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under-used contracts in the years 2003 and 2007.66 We constructed a 2x2 contingency table with 
a dummy indicating whether a contract was under-used (under-use=1) or not (under-use=0), and 
calendar year (2003, 2007) as variables (see Table 15). The results of a chi-square test of inde-
pendence support Hypothesis 6 since the null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between 
the row and the column frequencies, can be rejected at a significance level of p<.001 (φ=-.076). 
Specifically, the share of under-used BahnCards decreases from years 2003 (69.9%) to 2007 
(62.6%) by 7.3 percentage points. 
Hypothesis 6  under-use no yes total 
year 2003 n 12,024 27,880 39,904 
  % of year 30.1 69.9 100 
      
 2007 n 18,825 31,562 50,387 
  % of year 37.4 62.6 100 
      
total  n 30,849 59,442 90,291 
  % of year 25.5 74.5 100 
χ2   517.30   
df   1   
p   <.001   
φ   -.076   
Table 15. Empirical Results – Better Usage Over Time, Calendar Years 
However, focusing on individual experience with using a particular type of BahnCard, we ob-
tain mixed results with respect to Hypothesis 6. As explained above, we expect higher usage in 
subsequent years for the cohort of a particular BahnCard as compared to the initial group since 
users with ex post low usage should opt out or downgrade.  
Table 16 and Table 17 show the results of two one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests.67 
The test variable is total annual spending on tickets (based on the standard fare) with first, 
                                                     
66 Note that these are the first and the last completed calendar years in our database.  
67 The standard ANOVA test assumes equal variances within the samples. Yet, a Levene-test shows that 
the assumption of homogenous variances is violated here. Generally, the F-test reacts robust to this viola-
tion (Hair et al., 2009). However, as sample sizes differ significantly here, we applied the Welch statistic 
which is more powerful under these circumstances. Furthermore, the post-hoc analysis is carried out by 
means of the Tamhane T2-test which does not assume equal variances (Tamhane, 1977).   
BUYING WITHOUT USING: BIASES OF GERMAN BAHNCARD BUYERS 132
 
second and third year contracts being the three samples. The first test considers the BC25 co-
hort, the second the BC50 cohort.68  
Hypothesis 6  N Mean s.e.      p* 
annual ticket spending 1st contract 26,393 160.62 1.868 
annual ticket spending 2nd contract 17,924 119.45 1.960 
annual ticket spending 3rd contract 12,396 124.88 2.490  
post-hoc-tests   
1st vs. 2nd  41.16 2.707 <.001
1st vs. 3rd  35.74 3.113 <.001
2nd vs. 3rd   -5.429 3.169 .238
F 132.776   
Welch-Test 131.826   
df 2   
p** <.001   
* p values from Tamhane post-hoc test. 
** p values from oneway ANOVA Welch-statistics. p value from standard F statistic <.001. 
Table 16. Empirical Results – Better Usage Over Time, BahnCard25 Cohort 
With respect to the BC25 cohort, it can be seen that the average annual spending on tickets of 
the group of users that hold on to their contract in the second year is significantly lower than 
that of the initial group.  
Hypothesis 6  N Mean s.e.      p* 
annual ticket spending 1st contract 23,801 438.92 4.815  
annual ticket spending 2nd contract 18,859 427.70 5.901  
annual ticket spending 3rd contract 13,789 475.79 7.261  
post-hoc-tests    
1st vs. 2nd  11.22 7.616 .366
1st vs. 3rd  -36.87 8.712 <.001
2nd vs. 3rd -48.09 9.356 <.001
F 15.532   
Welch-Test 13.917   
df 2   
p** <.001   
* p values from Tamhane post-hoc test. 
** p values from oneway ANOVA Welch-statistics. p value from standard F statistic <.001.  
Table 17. Empirical Results – Better Usage Over Time, BahnCard50 Cohort 
In particular, the mean decreases from EUR 160.62 to EUR 119.45 (p<.001). In this respect, we 
do not find support for Hypothesis 6. Nevertheless, we see the average spending on tickets 
                                                     
68 The cohort samples were constructed as follows: First year BahnCards were included if contracted 
before year 2005 in order to ensure completeness of all potential successor contracts. Second and third 
year contracts were only included if the precedent contract was of the same type and if there was no gap 
between the contracts. 
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slightly rising from year two to three, although the difference in means fails to match common 
significance levels. 
However, turning to the BC50 cohort we do find tentative support for Hypothesis 6. Although 
spending slightly decreases from year one to two (p=.366), usage increases significantly from 
EUR 427.70 in the second year to EUR 475.79 in the third year (p<.001). 
Figure 12. Mean Diagrams Oneway ANOVA – Total Spending 
As Figure 12 illustrates there is a u-shaped development of annual spending in both cohorts. An 
explanation for these unexpected results could be that some users simply forget to cancel their 
cards whereas buying the first card needs a conscious decision. However, forgetting to cancel 
twice (i.e. again at the end of the second period) becomes more painful as the price of the 
BahnCard rises. Hence, this might be the reason why the increase in spending from the second 
to the third year is stronger for the BC50 cohort.  
Hypothesis 7 (Better Use Over Longer Periods): 
In the long run, BahnCard usage should improve from an individual perspective. On the one 
hand, inaccuracies in demand estimations might even out and, on the other hand, given that 
people learn from their mistakes, customers adapt by either switching contracts or modifying 
their buying behavior. A paired-samples t-test supports this (Table 18). The sample consists of 
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all customers who had at least three BahnCards. The test variables under consideration are as 
follows: The first variable is based on the difference in costs between the chosen BahnCard and 
ticket purchases and the price of the next lower contract and corresponding tickets, i.e., the utili-
ty of the first BahnCard. This variable is negative for under-used contracts and positive for op-
timal contracts. The second variable is the average utility of the first three BahnCards. As is 
illustrated by Table 18, the average utility of a first year BahnCard amounts to EUR 11.51. This 
is significantly lower than the average utility within the first three contract years which equals 
EUR 14.69 (p<.001).69 Hence, for individuals who hold on to a BahnCard contract, the use is 
better over longer periods of time. 
Hypothesis 7 N Mean s.e.         p* 
utility 1st contract 46,021 11.51 .672 
average utility contracts 1-3  46,021 14.69 .626 
difference  46,021 -3.18 .404 <.001
* p values from paired samples t-test. 
Table 18. Empirical Results – Better Usage Over Longer Periods 
  
                                                     
69 A Wilcoxon signed-rank test (e.g. Gibbons and Chakraborti, 2003) confirms the result at a significance 
level of p<.001. 
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6. Discussion and Implications 
There is empirical evidence in favor of most of our hypotheses. Most buyers of a BahnCard did 
not make the ex post optimal buying decision but they showed a flat-rate bias. Nevertheless, 
their decisions were not completely irrational but they showed, at least in the aggregate, 
bounded rationality and the ability to learn from suboptimal decisions in the past. Interestingly, 
the buyers of the more expensive BC50 made fewer mistakes than those of the cheaper BC25, 
whose buyers lost on average. Perhaps the BC25 is cheap enough that it is not worthwhile to 
bother about it.  
Analyzing real transactional data, our study provides valuable insights into customers’ contract 
choice and optimization behavior. Going into more detail, further research should scrutinize the 
cost side of customer decision making. As long as we do not know more about consumers’ cog-
nitive costs, it will remain difficult to determine the adequate point of comparison, as our analy-
sis has shown. This might be illustrated by the example of considering upper boundaries, i.e. 
over-usage becomes a mistake, too: As BahnCards can be upgraded virtually anytime through-
out contract duration, customers are forced to optimize continuously during the year; when only 
considering lower boundaries customers must make only two decisions, one at the beginning 
and another one at the end of the period. Hence, taking upper boundaries into account implies 
that the number of time consuming and rationally demanding (i.e. costly) decisions increases 
dramatically. Moreover, as decisions get more complicated, the point where the marginal costs 
of additional information gathering equate its (expected) marginal benefits could be reached 
very soon, making results that are inefficient in a frictionless world the optimal ones in a second 
best world. 
While we concentrated on the customers of BahnCards so far, there are some interesting impli-
cations for the selling side, in this case the DB AG, too. Offering BahnCards seems to be a very 
good idea for this service firm because the flat-rate bias brings a double dividend. Both the 
BahnCards and the reduced pay-per-mile fees bring in money and the net effect is clearly posi-
tive. Lower fees per mile encourage more traffic and the BahnCard fees more than compensate 
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the lower price per mile whereas the number of miles can be expected to be higher together with 
the total revenues. We do not know the costs of DB AG but they are probably mainly fixed such 
that the profits are up, too.  
Another interesting question for future research is the optimal structure of BahnCards, both for 
the customers and the seller. Would more BahnCards, e.g. a BahnCard75 or a BahnCard10 be a 
good idea? What about the current idea of DB AG to offer an additional BC25 for a shorter time 
period (four months instead of one year)? Rational customers could only win and never lose by 
more alternatives, because users can better adapt contract choice to individual travel habits. 
However, the outcome is less clear for bounded-rational customers. For instance, more alterna-
tives come with a narrowing of optimality intervals. This puts more weight on the appropriate 
assessment of future consumption and implies a higher probability of error. Sellers can win by 
more price discrimination but there are also potential downsides. For example, customers might 
take the anticipated regret of an erroneous decision into account, which – in the worst case – 
might dissuade them from choosing any option with increasing likelihood of failure. Further-
more, aspects such as e.g. raising costs of segmentation need to be considered, in order to obtain 
a comprehensive picture of the outcome of more price discrimination. 
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